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ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME AT THE IVORY TOWER: 
RELAXING THE TAX TREATMENT OF SERVICES 
DONATED TO CHARITIES BY THEIR EMPLOYEES     
 
 Mark J. Cowan
*
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
When a faculty member donates time to a college or university by, for example, teaching 
a summer course for no compensation, the federal income tax treatment of the donation 
can take one of two forms.  One possibility is that the donation will have no tax 
consequences.  The faculty member realizes no income from the donation and gets no 
charitable deduction.  A second possibility is that the faculty member will be required to 
recognize taxable income equal to the value of the services provided and then may 
(subject to certain limits) be allowed a charitable contribution deduction.  In many cases, 
the income and deduction do not fully offset, resulting in negative tax consequences for 
the faculty member.  This second possibility occurs when the faculty member directs 
where the funds saved by the donation are used within the institution.  Since faculty 
members normally would prefer to control the specific use of the saved funds, many 
donations would result in negative tax consequences sufficient to stifle the donation in 
the first place. This Article argues that the tax law should be clarified and relaxed to 
allow faculty members (and other employees of charitable organizations) to donate time 
to their employer institutions on a tax-free basis in more situations than is currently the 
case.  Alternatively, the Article suggests ways for charities to encourage donations of 
time by employees, even in the absence of a favorable law change.      
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“University professors never think of themselves as employees; they think of themselves 
as the heart of the place, as the texture of the place, as the essence of the place.  And they 
are right.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The tax law stifles attempts by employees of charities to do volunteer work for 
their employers.   The problem is manifest, for example, when a professor wants to 
contribute to his or her university employer by teaching a class for no compensation.   
This Article analyzes the problem of donated services by employees of charities 
(particularly in the context of colleges and universities), suggests reforms to remove the 
tax barriers to donating time, and recommends measures charities can take to ameliorate 
the tax impediments to employee volunteerism.   
  
 
A. Illustrating the Problem:  The Tax Education of Professor Flinty     
 
Professors Flinty and Clement were as different as they were inseparable.  For 34 
years, Flinty and Clement taught accounting at Metro-State University—a quality, but 
perpetually underfunded, regional institution.  “Hard Case” Flinty had a stern reputation 
for rigor.  “Easy A” Clement was known for his jovial nature.  Both were excellent 
teachers revered by generations of students.   Together, they battled countless committee 
assignments, fought to keep the sparse budget from being diverted from traditional 
disciplines (like accounting, marketing, and the arts and sciences) to “new age” programs 
and centers, graded thousands of exams, consulted on troubled students, co-authored 22 
peer-reviewed articles (three of which were actually worthwhile), dodged dozens of 
                                                 
1
 A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, A FREE AND ORDERED SPACE:  THE REAL WORLD OF THE UNIVERSITY 43 
(1989), reprinted in ROBERT BIRNBAUM, SPEAKING OF HIGHER EDUCATION:  THE ACADEMIC’S BOOK OF 
QUOTATIONS 218 (2004).     
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pushy textbook salesmen, hiked in 32 national parks (30 of which were actually 
worthwhile), attended 176 home football games, and pondered and debated the great 
accounting questions of the day.  Their relationship ended with Clement’s sudden death 
on a spring day at age 62.   
Flinty, nearing retirement and devastated over the loss of his friend, wanted to 
memorialize his colleague.  Rather than donate money to the university in Clement’s 
name, he thought a more appropriate honor would be to donate his time—doing what 
both he and Clement loved to do—teach.  Flinty agreed to take over a summer course on 
basic accounting that Clement was assigned to teach.  Flinty wanted to waive the usual 
$6,000 that he would receive for teaching the course and asked his department chair, 
Professor Toptier, to use the funds as seed money for a scholarship in Clement’s memory.  
Toptier wanted to oblige, but informed Flinty that the Dean of the College of Business, 
Dean Rankings, was taking all available salary savings and redeploying the funds to set 
up a new online degree program in underwater basket weaving management.
2
  Dean 
Rankings was under a lot of pressure to use the college’s resources to get the program 
running because a major donor made his most recent gift contingent on the college setting 
up the new online program.
3
    This was just the sort of “distracting new age boondoggle” 
that Clement and Flinty had fought against their entire careers.   
                                                 
2
 Cf.  Alisha Azevedo, “UnderAcademy College” Satirizes Massive Open Online Courses, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Sept. 14, 2012 (reporting on a free online “experimental college” that uses the motto “unaccredited 
since 2011” and offers courses such as “Grammar Porn” and “Underwater Procrastination and Advanced 
Desublimation Techniques”).    
3
 Someone likely convinced the Dean that the program aligned with (at least) two of the four goals in the 
college’s strategic plan (increasing online offerings and increasing interdisciplinary programs). Never 
underestimate the importance of aligning—at least in form—your suggestions with the otherwise ignored 
strategic plan.    
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Furious, Flinty insisted that Dean Rankings agree—in writing—that the $6,000 
savings be used for the Clement Memorial Scholarship fund rather than the new online 
program.  After some posturing and making it seem like he was doing Flinty a huge 
favor, the Dean agreed.   All was well—or so Flinty thought.   
That summer, after the accounting course had finished, Flinty noticed that his 
paycheck was lower than usual.  Upon inspection, he discovered that $6,000 had been 
added to his taxable income and that the income and payroll tax withholdings due on the 
$6,000 had been taken out of normal salary—reducing his take home pay.  Figuring this 
was an error, Flinty immediately called the payroll department to complain about being 
taxed on $6,000 of salary that he never received.  Payroll referred him to the university’s 
in-house tax attorney, Ms. Chary.   
Chary had recently been put in charge of the university’s tax compliance after an 
IRS audit revealed some rather slipshod procedures, particularly with regard to payroll 
reporting.  Chary had been instructed by the university’s Chief Financial Officer to 
ensure compliance with the tax law and to err on the side of the government if there was 
any ambiguity.   
Chary explained that since Flinty directed where the $6,000 would be spent (on 
the scholarship fund rather than at the whims of the Dean), in substance Flinty had 
received the $6,000 salary and then contributed it to the scholarship fund.  Chary referred 
to this phenomenon as “anticipatory assignment of income.”4  Accordingly, the $6,000 
salary was subject to income and payroll taxes as if he had received the cash.  Sensing 
Flinty’s rising anger, Chary quickly added that Flinty would be eligible to deduct the 
$6,000 that he was deemed to have contributed as a charitable contribution deduction.  
                                                 
4
 This confused Flinty, who had given out a lot of assignments in his career, but never income.  
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After all, Chary explained, if Flinty had simply donated $6,000 in cash to the scholarship 
fund, he would have been donating after-tax money and then taking a charitable tax 
deduction on his tax return.   Chary stressed that the charitable deduction would only 
eliminate part of Flinty’s issue because while it would reduce his taxable income for 
income tax purposes, it would not reduce his taxable income subject to payroll tax.  
Chary’s logical explanation and alluring promise of a deduction came as cold comfort, 
since Flinty and his wife did not itemize deductions on their tax return (even taking into 
account the $6,000).     
Flinty had tried to honor his good friend by donating his time doing what they 
both loved—teaching.  His reward was lower take-home pay.   Flinty was appalled, but 
got over it.  He realized two things.  First, that even time can be taxed.  Second, he was 
glad he didn’t specialize in tax accounting.   
 
B. The Problem of Donated Services      
 
The tax law governing services donated by employees of charities, especially by 
employees of colleges and universities (like Flinty), is in need of clarification and 
liberalization.  In a time of budget cuts due to declining state funding or endowment 
earnings, colleges and universities must get creative.   Reliance on more volunteers is 
one way to continue to staff student services while reducing costs.   The ones most 
likely to volunteer to help with the teaching mission of the university are those who 
have dedicated their careers to that endeavor—full time faculty members.  Such faculty 
may be  willing to teach an extra class or a summer class sans compensation.  Local 
 8 
 
business folks or other alumni also may be willing to pitch in and teach a course pro 
bono.   
Unfortunately, as Flinty discovered, a tax barrier stands in the way of these 
otherwise salutary relationships.   Unless structured properly, the service provider will 
have income and be deemed to have made a charitable contribution.  Apart from the 
possible negative tax consequences,
5
 the tax reporting involved simply comes as an 
unpleasant surprise and annoyance that may stifle attempts to encourage volunteerism.   
While focusing specifically on the unique landscape of higher education (be it 
state or private, nonprofit institutions), many of the issues explored here would be 
applicable to services donated by employees of charities in general.   The challenge 
throughout is crafting a rule that fosters donations of services while not opening the door 
to abuse.  This seemingly straightforward issue, as will be seen, invokes important issues 
of tax law, tax policy, and modern higher education practice, framed by the dark 
underside of faculty politics and the specter of subterfuge.   
This remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part II briefly reviews the 
basic, relevant tax rules governing charitable contributions.  Part III then looks at the 
rules that currently apply when services are donated to charity, how colleges and 
universities apply those rules, justifications for the rules, and how those rules can result in 
negative tax consequences to the donor.  Part IV presents numerical examples of the 
impact of the current rules, shows how the current rules can sometimes violate horizontal 
equity, and makes the case for relaxing the rules.  Part IV also provides examples of 
existing and proposed tax law provisions that provide (or would provide) relief in 
                                                 
5
 The negative tax consequences include the imposition of payroll taxes and the possibility that the charity 
deduction will not fully offset the imputed income because of limits on the deduction for charitable 
contributions.  These issues will be discussed in detail at infra Part III.E.   
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situations that are somewhat analogous to donated services.  Part V suggests ways that 
the rules can be relaxed and reviews the benefits and possible objections to relaxation.  
Part VI suggests ways that colleges and universities can, in the absence of liberalized 
treatment, remove the tax barriers themselves either by grossing-up employee-volunteers 
for the negative tax consequences of donating time or by changing their policies 
regarding the internal deployment of funds saved because of donated services.  Part VII 
briefly concludes. 
II. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN GENERAL 
To understand the discussion which follows, this Part will briefly review the basic 
tax rules of charitable contributions.  Individuals may deduct the amount of cash donated 
to charity during the year.
6
   The deduction is only available if the taxpayer elects to 
itemize deductions rather than take the standard deduction.
7
  The deduction is generally 
limited to 50% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI), with any excess carried 
over to the subsequent five years.
8
    While donations of cash are deductible, donations of 
                                                 
6
 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).  Special rules, not relevant here, apply to property donations.   
7
 See I.R.C. § 63(d) (defining itemized deductions as all allowable deductions except those allowable in 
calculating adjusted gross income); § 62(a) (listing the deductions allowable in calculating adjusted gross 
income; the deduction for charitable contributions under § 170 is not on the list).  Taxpayers who itemize 
tend to be those who own homes, with the mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions pushing their 
itemized deductions over the standard deduction.  Because of the limits on deductibility, a minority of 
taxpayers actually benefit from the charitable contribution deduction.  Nonetheless, charities often tout the 
benefits of tax-deductibility to potential donors, without acknowledging the limitations.  Lilian V. 
Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction:  An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. 
L.REV. 1307, 1309-10 (2012).   
8
 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (setting forth the general 50% limitation); 170(d)(1)(A) (providing rules for the five 
year carryover of excess contributions).  This is the general rule.  Lesser percentage limitations apply to 
special situations not relevant here.  Technically, the limit is 50% of the taxpayer’s “contribution base” for 
the year.  But the contribution base is simply the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income without considering any 
net operating loss carrybacks.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(G).  To simplify matters, and since net operating loss 
carrybacks are rare for employees, I will assume that the taxpayers in the examples in this Article do not 
have any net operating loss carrybacks.   
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time/services are not.
9
  But unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses incurred while 
performing volunteer services for a charity are deductible.
10
   
To qualify for a deduction, the contribution must be made to (or for the use of) an 
entity listed in Section 170(c).   For present purposes, the most relevant entities on the list 
are states and their political subdivisions
11
 and entities “organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.”12  The 
latter category embraces the archetypal charities like churches, homeless shelters, 
museums, and private schools.  These charities are normally ones that qualify for tax-
exempt status under Section 501(c)(3).
13
    
A private, nonprofit college or university, because it exists for educational 
purposes, is normally operated as a Section 501(c)(3) organization and is eligible to 
receive tax-deductible charitable donations.
14
  A public college or university is exempt 
from the federal income tax by virtue of being part of the state government.
15
  While state 
                                                 
9
 Reg. § 1.170A-1(g). 
10
 Id.  Such expenses are normally similar to the types of expenses one would incur with respect to a 
business. With regard to travel expenses incurred in charitable work, a deduction will only be allowed if 
“there is no significant element of personal pleasure, recreation, or vacation in such travel.”  I.R.C. §  
170(j).  Apparently the tax law views charitable work as serious labor.  So whatever you do, don’t enjoy 
yourself while volunteering.  The standard mileage rate allowed for charitable use of a passenger 
automobile is limited to 14 cents per mile, rather than the normal business mileage rate.  I.R.C.  § 170(i).   
11
 I.R.C. § 170(c)(1).  Payments are only deductible to such entities if “made for exclusively public 
purposes.”  Id.   
12
 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).   
13
 Compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) with I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).  While I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) defines what types of 
organizations are eligible for the exemption, it is I.R.C. § 501(a) that actually grants the exemption. 
Organizations that qualify for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and are eligible to receive tax-deductible 
contributions under § 170(c) are subject to several requirements to attain and maintain their tax-favored 
status.  Such requirements are beyond the scope of this article.  For more details, see generally Mark J. 
Cowan & Denise English, A Tax Primer for CPAs Volunteering at Nonprofit Organizations, THE TAX 
ADVISER, March 2007, at 150.   For present purposes, I assume that all organizations at issue in this Article 
meet the requisite requirements.     
14
 We are, of course, not discussing for-profit colleges and universities—like the University of Phoenix 
(owned by the Apollo Group; see http://www.apollogrp.edu) since such entities are taxable and are not 
eligible to receive tax deductible donations.   
15
 At first glance, it appears that I.R.C. § 115 covers the tax treatment of state governments.  § 115(1) states 
that “[g]ross income does not include income derived from a public utility or the exercise of any essential 
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governments are eligible to receive tax-deductible donations directly,
16
 most donors give 
to a public university via a separate “supporting organization” that independently 
qualifies as a section 501(c)(3) organization. A supporting organization raises funds, 
manages endowments, and distributes funds for the benefit of the supported public 
university.
 17
  There appears to be, therefore, little distinction between giving to a private, 
                                                                                                                                                 
governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof . . . .”  Thus, per § 115, it 
appears that income from a commercial enterprise of a state government (which would not be considered 
an “essential governmental function”) would be subject to the federal income tax while income from a 
governmental function would be exempt.  The IRS, however, has interpreted the “accruing to” language in 
§ 115 as meaning that the commercial/governmental distinction only applies to entities owned by state 
governments. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 14,407, 1935-1 C.B. 103 (Jan. 23, 1935).   State governments 
themselves are not subject to § 115.  Id.  Rather, the IRS views state governments as simply falling outside 
the scope of the Internal Revenue Code.  Id.  Under the IRS’s view, all income of a state government, 
commercial or governmental, is exempt from the federal income tax.  See id.  While the rationale for this 
stance is unclear, the IRS’s approach at least has the virtue of avoiding the difficult task of distinguishing 
between the commercial and governmental functions of the state government.  Although the IRS views 
states (including state colleges and universities) as generally beyond the reach of the I.R.C., there is one 
code provision that specifically subjects some income of states to the federal income tax.  I.R.C. § 
511(a)(2)(B) applies the unrelated business income tax (UBIT) to state colleges and universities.   
16
 See supra note 11.   
17
 The structure used by the University of Idaho, for example, is typical.  The school’s endowment is owned 
and managed by a separate entity, the University of Idaho Foundation, Inc., for the exclusive benefit of the 
University of Idaho.  See http://www.uidahofoundation.org.  The foundation handles fundraising for the 
University of Idaho, and all decisions regarding fundraising priorities are set by the administration of the 
university itself.  See Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http://uidahofoundation.org/uidahofoundation/about/faqs.  The foundation’s website explains the use of a 
separate fundraising and endowment organization as follows: 
Why is the [University of Idaho] Foundation separate from the University of Idaho? The 
vast majority of American public colleges and universities have separate Foundations, 
organized as not-for-profit 501 ( c ) ( 3 ) corporations, for good reasons: confidentiality of 
personal documents related to gifts such as wills, trust agreements and correspondence;  
stewardship of endowment funds to ensure the joint goals of growth and return are met in 
the best interest of the donors; and to provide flexibility through discretionary funds to 
the growth of programs of excellence at the University of Idaho. 
Id.  The last point, regarding “flexibility through discretionary funds,” is critical.  Public colleges and 
universities use separate foundations in order to raise private money that they can use outside of the 
confines of state-imposed restrictions on expenditures.  E.g., BRUCE M. STAVE, RED BRICK IN THE LAND OF 
STEADY HABITS:  CREATING THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, 1881-2006 112-13 (2006) (reporting that 
the University of Connecticut established a foundation in the 1960s to create a pool of funds the school 
could use, without state restrictions, to help the school achieve excellence); see also UConn Foundation 
FAQ at   http://www.foundation.uconn.edu/faq.html   (explaining the relationship between the University 
of Connecticut and its foundation).  Many schools have more than one supporting foundation.  For 
example, a school may have, in addition to its general supporting foundation, an athletic booster club that 
raises and invests money to support the school’s athletics programs.  E.g., Paul Fain, Oregon Debates Role 
of Big Sport Donors, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Oct. 26, 2007, at A38 (indicating how donations raised by 
booster clubs are used in college and university athletic departments).     
 12 
 
nonprofit university and a public university.
 18
 But the distinction may become important, 
as discussed below, when looking at the tax treatment of an employee’s donation of time 
to her employer-university that benefits a separate supporting organization.
19
  
A donation to an individual is not deductible, regardless of how needy the 
recipient may be.
20
  Likewise, a donation to a charitable organization is not deductible if 
it is designated for the benefit of a particular individual.
21
   Indeed, an essential element 
of a charitable contribution is “indefiniteness of bounty” in that the gift benefits the 
                                                 
18
 The private/public distinction is, of course, relevant for nontax legal reasons.  For example, a public 
institution owes due process and other constitutional protections to students, faculty, and staff while private 
institutions generally do not.  E.g. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 42 (4th ed. 2006).  The line dividing public and private institutions is not always clear.  See id. 
at 42-43.       
19
 See infra Part V.A.1.  Private colleges and organizations supporting public colleges are generally not 
classified as “private foundations” under the tax law. Colloquially, a private foundation is a section 
501(c)(3) organization that derives the bulk of its support from limited sources—normally a wealthy family 
or a corporation. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 472 (3d ed. 2010).  Note that whether or not an organization has “foundation” in its 
name is of no consequence.   Many nonprofits use “foundation” in their name but are not subject to the 
private foundation rules.  Technically, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are considered private 
foundations unless they meet one of the enumerated exceptions to such status.  I.R.C. § 509.  Colleges and 
universities, regardless of the source of their funds, are not classified as private foundations.   I.R.C. § 
509(a)(1) (indicating that an organization described in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) will not be considered a 
private foundation); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (referring to “an educational organization which normally 
maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students 
in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on”—a definition which 
obviously applies to the typical college or university).  Likewise, organizations supporting public colleges 
and universities are normally exempt from private foundation status.  I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) (indicating that an 
organization described in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) will not be considered a private foundation); I.R.C. § 
170(b)(1)(A)(iv) (referring to an organization with substantial public support “which is organized and 
operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make expenditures to or for the 
benefit of a college or university . . . and which is an agency or instrumentality of a State. . .”).  Such 
organizations are commonly referred to as “supporting organizations.”  Provided these organizations meet 
the requisite public support test, they will not be classified as private foundations.  Section 501(c)(3) 
organizations that are classified as private foundations are subject to a litany of requirements in addition to 
the normal rules governing tax exempt organizations See generally I.R.C. § 4940-4945.  Further discussion 
is not necessary.  Throughout all of the examples in this Article, I assume that the organizations at issue (be 
they associated with a college or not) are not private foundations.   
20
 See I.R.C. §170(c) (listing the organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible donations).   
21
 S.E. Thomason v. Comm’r, 2 TC 441 (1943) (holding that a taxpayer could not deduct payments made to 
support a specific individual, who was a ward of a charitable organization).   
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charitable class of the organization in general, and not any particular individual.
 22
  Thus, 
a donor cannot mandate that an endowed chair go to a particular professor or that a 
scholarship fund be disbursed to a particular student.   But short of naming the intended 
beneficiary, donors have a lot of leeway in designating how their gifts will be used.  A 
donor may, for example, earmark the donation for use in the construction of a particular 
building, for a scholarship for students with a particular attribute
23
 (e.g., junior year 
accounting majors), or for an endowed chair to be awarded to a scholar that researches or 
teaches in particular area.
24
  The key is that the organization (and not the donor) have 
control over the funds and the donor’s “intent in making the payment must have been to 
benefit the charitable organization itself and not the individual recipient.”25  Given this 
landscape (no deduction for a gift designated for a particular individual; deduction for a 
gift with a designated purpose), charities and their donors can be quite ingenious in 
structuring donations so that the identity of the individual(s) benefiting are theoretically 
“indefinite,” but in reality readily known.  This “wink and a nod” type of arrangement, 
while questionable, is likely rather common.  Imagine, for example, a wealthy donor 
wants to benefit a favorite teacher from many years ago who studies the impact of beer 
sales on fruit flies. The donor can designate her gift for an endowed chair for a scholar of 
                                                 
22
 Id. at 444.  As the Tax Court notes: “Charity begins where certainty in beneficiaries ends, for it is the 
uncertainty of the objects and not the mode of relieving them which forms the essential element of charity.”  
Id. at 443.      
23
 The attributes should not involve racial or other suspect classes.  There is a loose “public policy” 
requirement that is imposed on by the courts.  The primary authority in this area is Bob Jones University v. 
U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983).  Even though I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) has no explicit public policy requirement, the 
Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Bob Jones University’s tax exemption because the school 
discriminated on the basis of race.  Id .at 605.  Such discrimination violated a clear public policy and 
therefore violated common law notions of “charity.”  Id. at 586.   
24
 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. 105 (allowing a charitable deduction for amounts given to 
schools for scholarships where the schools chosen were those at which the taxpayer recruited employees;  a 
scholarship recipient was under no obligation to work for the donor and the donor was under no obligation 
to hire the scholarship recipient).   
25
 Id.   
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such a topic.  Lo and behold, it turns out there is really only one scholar eligible for the 
support.   
Another limit on deductibility is that the donation must be a true gift to the 
charity.  That is, the donation must be made with “detached and disinterested generosity” 
with no expectation of an economic benefit being given by the charity in exchange for the 
donation.
 26
   This rule exists to prevent taxpayers from deducting amounts paid to a 
charity that were really for purchases of goods and services.  For example, a taxpayer 
cannot claim charitable contribution deductions for payments of tuition to a university or 
medical bills to a hospital.  The payments were made to charities, but they were made in 
return for services, not as gifts.
27
  
Individuals are motivated to give for a variety of reasons.  Some give out of pure 
altruism—a genuine concern for the welfare of others.28  Those who give out of a sense 
of altruism do so unselfishly and get no return benefit from their donations.
29
  Others give 
to experience “warm glow”—the enjoyment from making others happy, the recognition, 
and the sense of self-satisfaction that can come with donating.
30
  Others give perhaps for 
religious reasons or more selfish reasons—to butter up a business acquaintance, to bolster 
                                                 
26
 Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).  While Duberstein involved the issue of whether a 
transfer was a gift for income tax purposes under I.R.C. § 102, the same standard applies for purposes of 
the charitable contribution deduction under I.R.C. §170.   
27
 Such payments may be deductible under other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code—for example as 
tuition payments or medical expenses—but the payments do not qualify as charitable contributions.  Often 
a taxpayer will make a payment to a charity that is really a dual payment—part charitable gift, part 
purchase.  This often occurs where a taxpayer buys tickets to a benefit concert for more than the fair market 
value of the concert tickets.  Part of the payment is a nondeductible purchase (the fair market value of the 
concert tickets) and part is a charitable contribution (the excess over fair market value).  The taxpayer must 
prove that he intended to make a charitable gift for the excess.  See Reg. § 1.170A-1(h).  See also Rev. Rul. 
67-246, 1967-2, C.B. 104 for examples of these scenarios.  Further discussion is beyond the scope of this 
Article.   
28
 THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 33 (JCX-4-13, Feb. 11, 2013) 
[hereinafter PRESENT LAW].     
29
 Id.  
30
 Id.  
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one’s image in the community, to attain donor privileges to buy athletic tickets, etc.  The 
more selfish reasons for giving—those where the donor receives a substantial return 
benefit—may serve to limit or erase the deduction.31    
Some scholars opine that the deduction for charitable contributions is a 
government subsidy; akin to the government providing funds to donors or charitable 
organizations.
32
  But others view charitable contributions not as a subsidy, but as a 
necessary deduction to arrive at a normative measure of income.
33
  The tax law’s 
normative notion of income, at least in the personal realm, derives from the Haig-Simons 
definition:  income is equal to the taxpayer’s consumption during the year plus the 
increase in the taxpayer’s wealth during the year (wealth at the end of the year less wealth 
at the beginning of the year).
 34
  The question is whether donations to charity are 
“consumption” for purposes of this definition.  If charitable contributions are not 
consumption, but rather decreases in wealth, then they should be deductible.  If charitable 
contributions are consumption, then they should not be deductible under a normative 
income tax.  If charitable contributions are consumption but the government nonetheless 
allows a deduction for charity, then the government has made a policy choice to deviate 
from the norm and provide a subsidy to the charitable sector and to donors.  Indeed, the 
tax expenditures budget, which reports the government’s revenue losses from special tax 
                                                 
31
 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.   
32
 For an overview of the subsidy view of charity, see FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 19, at 595-615 
(internal citations omitted).  See also William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 
86 HARV.L. REV. 309, 344 n. 64 (1972) (referencing sources that call the charitable deduction a subsidy). 
33
 E.g., Andrews, supra note 32, at 346. 
34
 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION:  THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL 
POLICY 50 (1938). 
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breaks that deviate from a normal income tax, takes this view.
35
  The deduction for 
individuals is expected to cost the government $36.2 billion in lost revenue in 2012.
36
   
Scholars such as William Andrews disagree with the subsidy view and argue that 
many contributions are not consumption by donors, but are consumption by the charitable 
class (needy, students, patients, etc.) of the donee organization.
37
  Since consumption is 
shifted from the donor to the donee, the charitable contributions should be removed from 
the donor’s taxable income under a normative income tax.38  Andrews notes that this 
occurs in other areas of the tax law.  When generous business owners pay slightly above-
market wages to their employees, for example, they get business deductions—shifting the 
income from the business owners to the employees.
39
  Andrews opines that a similar shift 
of income should occur for taxpayers who give to charity.
40
 
With this basic overview in mind, we now look in more detail at the tax treatment 
of donated services.   
 
 
                                                 
35
 THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017 2 (JCS-1-13, FEB. 1, 2013) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURES].   
36
 See id. at 37 ($4.9 billion in lost revenue on charitable contributions to educational institutions), 38 
($28.8 million in lost revenue on charitable contributions other than for education and health; includes 
charitable donations to religious organizations), & 39 ($2.5 million in lost revenue on charitable 
contributions to health organizations).  
37
 Andrews, supra note 32, at 347. 
38
 Id.  Andrews argues that the donation should in theory be taxed at the tax rate of the recipient members 
of the charitable class, but notes the rate will be zero in most cases (because the recipients are likely to have 
few earnings—most of which will be offset by personal exemptions and standard deductions in calculating 
taxable income).  Id.  As a practical matter, recipients of charitable assistance are normally viewed as 
receiving non-taxable gifts.    
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. Andrews acknowledges counterarguments that charitable contributions may be consumption if the 
donor is buying warm-glow effects or simply because the donor controls the resources being used—even 
though the resources are being used to help others. Id.  at 346.  Similarly, some commentators say that 
those who give out of pure altruism are shifting wealth rather than engaging in consumption while those 
who give for warm glow or other benefits are in fact engaging in consumption.  See PRESENT LAW, supra 
note 28, at 33.  But, as a practical matter, unless something tangible is received in return, it is hard for the 
tax system to look too closely into the subjective motives of donors. 
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III. THE CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF DONATED SERVICES 
  This Part provides an overview of the current tax law guidance about donated 
services and the theories that commentators have articulated to explain those rules.  The 
tax treatment of donations of time by employees of charities could arguably take one of 
two opposing forms, both based on long-established tax law.  One possibility follows the 
general rules for donations of time in which there are no tax consequences.  The second 
possibility, and the one that colleges and universities are assuming (with good reason) is 
applicable, relies on doctrines such as constructive receipt and assignment of income to 
impute income to the employee and then (if the employee otherwise qualifies) allow the 
employee a deduction for the charitable contributions.  Parts A and B discuss each 
possibility, Part C reviews current practice in higher education, Part D reviews the 
rationale for the current rules, and Part E shows how the tax law does not always allow a 
taxpayer in the imputed income/deduction category to come out even.         
 
A. First Possibility:  No Income/No Deduction      
 
 
As noted above, donations of services to charity are normally not deductible.  
There are two rationales for this seemingly harsh rule—one practical and the other 
theoretical.  First, unlike cash donations, service donations are difficult to value.  Any 
value chosen would necessarily be subjective, and the tax law becomes difficult to 
administer when forced to deal with subjectivity.  The value of the donated services will 
vary by the skills of the individual donor and the nature of services being provided.  The 
IRS simply cannot be expected to police the amount of claimed tax deductions for time 
on a taxpayer by taxpayer basis.   The IRS does not confront this valuation issue in the 
 18 
 
non-gratuitous setting because the tax law assumes (reasonably, in most cases) that the 
services provided are worth exactly what the service recipient paid for those services.  
This notion, known as the arm’s length concept,41 is not available to assist in valuing 
services performed for charity without compensation.
42
  Accordingly, not allowing a 
deduction for donated services appears sensible. 
One could argue that the tax law could have taken a less draconian approach to 
the valuation issue.  Congress could have, for example, provided for a deduction for time 
based on some arbitrary but uniform per-hour rate, with charities subject to reporting 
                                                 
41
 See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES:  A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER 
TAXES 317 n. 15 (4th ed. 2008).  Under the arm’s length concept, the tax law generally assumes that the 
contracting parties and the market set prices and values in transactions between unrelated parties.  The tax 
law will respect such prices and values in calculating tax even if they are “wrong” and one party got a 
bargain while another got a bad deal.  But the tax law carves out special rules for, and the tax authority 
focuses its limited enforcement resources on scrutinizing, those prices/values that were not established in 
arm’s length dealings—like transactions between related parties.   It is those transactions that may well 
result in manipulated prices and reduced tax liability, and which are worthy of special scrutiny and possible 
adjustment to fair market value.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (giving Treasury power to reallocate income, 
deductions, and other tax items among related entities to clearly reflect income). 
42
 Despite the practical difficulties of valuation, charities that prepare financial statements under Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are required to report the fair market value (both as revenue and 
as an expense—or an asset if capitalized) of certain donated services.  These are generally limited to 
service contributions that enhance nonfinancial assets (like land, buildings, or supplies) or that require 
specialized skills (generally services provided by licensed professionals—like an accountant, a lawyer, a 
plumber, a teacher, etc.).  Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 
958-605-25-16.  The value of other service contributions need not be reported, but must be disclosed if 
practicable.  ASC 958-605-50-1.  It could be argued that since this information is readily available for 
GAAP, the tax law can simply accept these values.  But, first, not all charities report their results under 
GAAP.   The tax form that most charities are required to file, Form 990, specifically instructs charities to 
NOT include the value of donated services in revenue or expense (although they may provide a narrative 
description of such services).  2010 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT 
FROM INCOME TAX 12.   Second, the tax law often disregards GAAP, especially when GAAP uses 
estimates.  For example, for-profit entities estimate their bad debt expense for credit sales each year for 
GAAP purposes, but are only allowed to deduct such expense on their tax returns when the related 
receivable has been written-off/becomes worthless.  I.R.C. § 166.  As the Supreme Court has stated:   
Financial accounting, in short, is hospitable to estimates, probabilities, and reasonable 
certainties; the tax law, with its mandate to preserve the revenue, can give no quarter to 
uncertainty. This is as it should be. Reasonable estimates may be useful, even essential in 
giving shareholders and creditors an accurate picture of a firm's overall financial health; 
but the accountant's conservatism cannot bind the Commissioner in his efforts to collect 
taxes.   
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522, 543 (1979).  Accordingly, the availability of some estimate 
of value for some donated services for some charities that report under GAAP cannot reliably be used to 
support a tax law that would allow a deduction for donated services.    
 Assignment of Income at the Ivory Tower 
 
19 
 
 
requirements regarding the amount of time donated by each individual.
43
  Such an 
approach would still suffer from practical difficulties in that charities would need to keep 
better track of their various volunteers (sometimes an informal and chaotic process).  
Also, such an approach would not satisfy the second rationale for nondeductibility of 
service donations—to which we now turn.   
The second, and more theoretical, rationale for not allowing a deduction for the 
value of donated services is to prevent taxpayers from getting a double benefit for 
donating time.  Because our income tax has a broad definition of income, most charitable 
donations of cash are financed by funds that were taxed.
44
  Allowing a deduction for cash 
donations thus cancels out the taxed income and effectively removes the donation from 
the tax base.  With a donation of time, the taxpayer is not reporting any taxable income 
for their forgone earnings.  Allowing a deduction for such taxpayers would thus create a 
double benefit:  no income included in taxable income for the forgone earnings and a 
deduction for the volunteered time.   
The Haig-Simons normative definition of income, discussed above, does not 
tackle the issue of time donated to charity.
45
  But Henry Simons does note that “income 
in kind”—in particular income generated from one’s own labors—cannot practically be 
taxed under a normative income tax.
46
  That is, the value of goods and services we 
produce for ourselves—such as growing our own food or mowing our own lawns—is 
                                                 
43
 See infra note 212 for a similar proposal.   
44
 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a) (noting that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . gross income means all income 
from whatever source derived).  Of course, not all income is subject to tax.  For example, the income 
donated to charity may have been made with tax-exempt income, such as interest income from municipal 
bonds (I.R.C. § 103(a)) or the rental of property for less than 15 days (I.R.C. § 280A(g)).   Also, the 
donation may have been funded by a nontaxable gift or inheritance (I.R.C. § 102(a)).  Of course, such 
income tax free transfers may have been subject to gift tax or estate tax.  Thus, the theory is not perfect. 
45
 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.   
46
 SIMONS, supra note 34, at 110-12.   
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technically “income” but the value of such income cannot be accurately measured and 
cannot be policed efficiently by the tax authority.   Simons calls income in kind “one of 
the real imponderables of the income definition” yet one that “considerations of justice, 
not to mention those of administration, argue” be excluded from taxable income.47    
William Andrews has taken Simons’s thoughts a bit further by analyzing the 
interaction of the exclusion for imputed income and the charitable deduction rules.
48
  In a 
classic example, adapted here with some modifications, Andrews compares the tax 
consequences that befall a doctor who treats patients for free at a 501(c)(3) medical clinic 
with a tax lawyer who donates money to the medical clinic.
49
  Assume the doctor and the 
lawyer each makes $800 per day in doing their regular jobs.  The doctor takes a day off 
from work to provide services at the medical clinic.  The lawyer, who has no skills the 
clinic can use, works an extra day at his job, earning an additional $800, and then donates 
the $800 (in cash) to the clinic.  Under our tax law, the doctor would get no deduction for 
her charitable work.  The lawyer would get an $800 deduction for his charitable donation 
of cash.
50
   While it appears the lawyer is in a better tax position, in reality the doctor and 
the lawyer are in the same position.  This is because the lawyer realized $800 of taxable 
income from working the extra day while the doctor did not need to include in taxable 
income the $800 of salary she gave up to work at the clinic.
51
  Thus, the doctor and the 
lawyer are in the same tax position, as follows: 
 
                                                 
47
 Id. at 124.   
48
 See Andrews, supra note 32, at 347-48.   
49
 Id.  Andrews’s original example did not include numbers.  I have added them—and a few other details—
here for illustration.    
50
 Assuming the lawyer itemizes his deductions and is not impacted by the limits on deductibility discussed 
at infra Part III.E.   
51
 Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (discussed in more detail at infra Part III.B.5).   
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 Doctor Lawyer 
Taxable Income 0 $800 
Charitable Deduction 0 ($800) 
Net 0 0 
 
Since the donor of time and the donor of cash end up in the same position, this can justify 
denying a charitable deduction to the former while granting it to the latter.    
While Andrews’s example comes out neatly, keep in mind it only shows that the 
two taxpayers are on the same footing when it comes to income taxes.  But the two are 
not in the same position for payroll/self-employment taxes.  The doctor, without any 
wages, has no payroll tax liability.  The lawyer, however, will need to pay FICA (if an 
employee) or self-employment tax (if self-employed) on his $800 of extra earnings.  
FICA and self-employment taxes are on gross pay; there is no deduction for charitable 
contributions from payroll taxes.
52
    Furthermore, the lawyer may have limits on his 
ability to deduct the full $800, as discussed below.
53
  Because of the deduction limits that 
can apply, it is possible that the lawyer (who gets a deduction) is actually worse off tax-
wise than the doctor (who gets no deduction).  After all, an exclusion from income is 
almost always preferred to a deduction.   
B. Second Possibility: Imputed Income/Deduction     
Donating time may result in tax consequences if the donors are viewed as 
assigning income which they earned to a charity.  In such a case, the donors will be 
deemed to have earned taxable income via their work, and must pay income tax 
                                                 
52
 See more detail at infra Part III.E.5.   
53
 See infra Part III.E.   
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(including FICA).   The donors will then be deemed to have donated the earned income 
to the charity and may take charitable contribution deductions as if they had remitted cash 
to the charity.  An assignment of income situation can occur when individuals assign 
their wages to a charity, or (as in Flinty’s situation in our opening example) when the 
donors are employed by a charity but forgo some of their salary.   
Because there is no primary authority directly on point, this Part will analogize 
from authorities in related areas.  In the materials reviewed in this Part III.B, two 
fundamental tax doctrines are invoked:  constructive receipt and assignment of income.  
The constructive receipt doctrine prevents a cash basis taxpayer from postponing the 
reporting of income “by failure to exercise his or her unrestricted power to collect it.”54  
Cash basis taxpayers normally include amounts in taxable income upon actual receipt in 
cash.
55
   But this rule provides the opportunity for manipulation.  Cash basis taxpayers 
might be motivated, for example, to refuse cash they are owed near year end and ask the 
payor to pay in the new tax year.  Unchecked, cash basis taxpayers could post-pone 
income into a different tax year.  The taxpayer will still pay tax on the payment, but has 
managed to defer the tax a year while only deferring the receipt of the payment by a few 
days.  Deferral of tax is a classic tenant of tax planning that makes the taxpayer better off 
on an after-tax time value of money basis.
56
  To prevent this tax deferral, the tax law 
requires that cash method taxpayers not only report actual cash received but also cash 
constructively received.
57
  The regulations note: 
                                                 
54
 RICHARD A. WESTIN, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 132 (2000).   
55
 Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1).   
56
 Deferral makes sense if the taxpayer will be subject to the same marginal tax rate in each year.  If the 
marginal rate in the second year is expected to be higher, the taxpayer would balance the additional tax that 
would be due because of deferral against the time value of money savings associated with deferral.   
57
 Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1).   
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Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is 
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is 
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so 
that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon 
it during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been 
given. However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's 
control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.
58
 
 
So, if income is available, waiting for the taxpayer to claim it in cash, the taxpayer 
cannot turn his back on the income and wait until a later tax year to claim it.  Regardless 
of when he claims it, it is taxable in the year it is available to him and within his control 
to claim.  A fitting, but hard to detect, example would be a cash basis plumber who 
repairs a customer’s sink on December 27, 2012 and bills the customer $1,000.  The 
customer is so pleased with the job that he offers the plumber a $1,000 check on 
December 27.  If the plumber refuses the check and asks the customer to mail him the 
check instead—and the check arrives on January 2, 2013—the plumber may think he has 
deferred income to his 2013 Form 1040.  But under the constructive receipt doctrine, the 
plumber would be required to include the $1,000 in income on his 2012 Form 1040, 
despite the fact that he “received” the cash/check in 2013.59   
The classic case of constructive receipt, explained above, would not appear to 
apply to a situation like Flinty’s.  The plumber was trying to defer income by waiting a 
few days (until the new tax year) to claim his income.  At the end of the day, he still gets 
the $1,000.  But Flinty was not trying to game the system.  Flinty is never going to 
receive the $6,000.  He was trying to give it away.  Even so, Flinty did constructively 
                                                 
58
 Reg. 1.451-2(a).   
59
 As noted, this would be hard for the IRS to detect.  But the law is the law and the constructive receipt 
doctrine helps protect the government from these maneuvers on a much larger scale.  Given the difficulty 
that the IRS has in auditing small business like the plumber, we should be thankful the plumber is reporting 
the $1,000 at all.  There is strong incentive to take payment in cash and not report it since there is no third 
party reporting (1099s, W-2s) like there is in other tax situations.  Furthermore, it is not very efficient for 
the IRS to audit many small businesses like the plumber for a small amount of revenue per audit.   
 24 
 
receive the $6,000 because he had control over the funds.  Even though the cash never 
passed through his hands, he did oversee their passage from the university’s payroll 
accounts to the scholarship fund.  It is no different from Flinty taking the cash in his 
paycheck and then sending the cash to the scholarship fund.  He cannot avoid the income 
by simply controlling things from afar.  Thus, while the constructive receipt doctrine is 
not directly on point, its core principle can be applied to donated services.
60
    
The second tax doctrine that might be invoked is assignment of income.  Like 
constructive receipt, it does not neatly fit into the donated services context but its 
principles do apply.  The assignment of income doctrine is “a judicial doctrine that treats 
attempts at gratuitous transfers of income interests as ineffective to shift income to 
another.”61   As discussed more fully below in connection with the Earl case, the doctrine 
requires that one who earns income pay tax on the income.  A taxpayer cannot assign 
income to another (usually a family member) and escape taxation.   In the donated 
services context, this is not what is going on.  Flinty is not assigning his salary to, say, his 
son—keeping the income in the family.  Instead, he is giving the income away to an 
entity—the university or its foundation—that would not pay tax on it in any event.  It 
does not benefit Flinty from an economic perspective to do this.  But it does accomplish 
his goal of funding a scholarship in honor of his friend.   
There is no regulation, case, or ruling that explicitly applies either the constructive 
receipt doctrine or the assignment of income doctrine to donated services like in Flinty’s 
                                                 
60
 One reviewer has suggested that Flinty might avoid the constructive receipt doctrine because he refused 
the income prior to rendering services.  The problem with this conclusion is that Flinty had control over 
where the saved proceeds were used—they were designated for a particular scholarship program.  Even if 
he avoids constructive receipt under such facts, he would (as discussed in more detail below) be subject to 
tax under the assignment of income doctrine.  See the discussion of the Giannini and Hedrick cases at infra 
Part III.B.4 for more discussion on this issue. 
61
 WESTIN, supra note 54, at 54.   
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case.  But as the materials explored below show, it is not a far journey from existing case 
law, regulations, and rulings to Flinty’s situation.   
1.  Assignment in the Employment Context:  Old Colony Trust  
 
 In Old Colony Trust,
62
 the American Woolen Company paid the federal and state 
income tax liabilities on the salaries of its executives for 1918, 1919, and 1920.
63
  These 
payments, approved by the company’s board of directors, ensured that the executives 
would take home their full pre-tax salary.
64
   For example, if an executive had a gross 
salary of $1 million and was in the 35% tax bracket,
65
 the company would pay $350,000 
to the federal government on behalf of the executive—allowing the executive to enjoy his 
or her full $1 million cash salary after taxes.  The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court 
was whether the company’s payments of employee income taxes ($350,000 in our 
example) were taxable compensation income to the employee.   
The Court ruled that the tax payments were compensation and so were taxable to 
the employees.
66
  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft noted that the tax payments 
were made under an agreement between the employee and employer—indicating that the 
payments were intended as compensation.
67
  The fact that the company made the 
payments directly to the government (rather than to the employee) was of no importance:  
“The discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the 
                                                 
62
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).   
63
 Id. at 719-20.   
64
 See id.  
65
 For simplicity, 2012 tax rates are used and payroll taxes are ignored.   
66
 Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 729.   
67
 Id.  
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person taxed.”68  In other words, the employee has constructively received the tax 
payment and thus must include it in taxable income.  
Old Colony Trust makes it clear that employees cannot avoid taxation by having 
their employer pay their personal bills—be they tax bills or otherwise.  This rule makes 
perfect sense and protects the tax system from disguised income techniques.  For 
example, assume that my personal monthly electric bill is $50.   I have to pay this bill out 
of my earnings—most of which, if not all, have been subject to income tax.  Thus, I must 
pay the $50 with after-tax income.  Since personal electric bills (like federal income tax 
payments) are not deductible, I would have no offsetting deduction for making the 
payment.  I cannot change this result by having my employer pay the electric bill for me.  
If I asked my employer, Boise State University, to hold back $50 of my paycheck and 
send the $50 directly to the Idaho Power Company to pay my personal electric bill, Boise 
State would still report the transaction as if I had received the income and then paid the 
power bill myself.  Thus, I would be taxed on the $50, just as if I had received it in cash.   
The $50 would be subject to income tax withholding and payroll tax withholding.  Since 
payments of personal electric bills are not deductible, I would not get an offsetting 
deduction for the $50 I would be deemed to have paid to Idaho Power.  Old Colony Trust 
thus ensures that the tax treatment of paying a personal expense (be it taxes or electric 
bills) is the same whether taxpayers pay them directly or have their employer pay them.   
It is easy to extrapolate from the tax payments at issue in Old Colony Trust to the 
to the utility bill example because both tax payments and personal utility bills are not 
deductible.  But what if an employer makes a payment on behalf of an employee for an 
expense that would normally be deductible if paid directly by the employee?  Old Colony 
                                                 
68
 Id.   
 Assignment of Income at the Ivory Tower 
 
27 
 
 
Trust would indicate that the amount paid by the employer is still taxable to the employee 
(subject to withholding of income tax and payroll taxes).  The employee would still be 
deemed to have paid the expense directly and therefore would be able to claim a 
deduction on his or her Form 1040.   The employee is still in the same position as if he or 
she had earned the income, paid income and payroll tax on it, and then took an income 
tax deduction for it.   
For example, if I wish to make a $100 charitable donation to the United Way, I 
could either (1) write a check for $100 to the United Way or (2) ask my employer to 
withhold $100 from my paycheck(s) and remit it to the United Way.  While the two 
options differ in form, they are the same in substance and thus should lead to the same tax 
results.  And they do.  In both options, my normal gross pay is subject to income and 
payroll tax withholding without reduction by the $100.  I then can claim a charitable 
contribution deduction for $100, assuming I meet all the requirements to do so.   
But the analogy between Old Colony Trust and the United Way example is not 
exact.  Old Colony Trust involved a payment by an employer to an employee’s creditor 
(the federal government).  The payment benefited the employee by paying the 
employee’s obligation.  In contrast, the donation to the United Way is presumably not 
obligatory, but rather is gratuitous.  Indeed, it must be gratuitous to be deductible.  As 
noted previously, a charitable contribution must be given with no expectation of a return 
benefit; that is, with detached and disinterested generosity.
69
   In contributing to the 
United Way, I, unlike the executives at Old Colony Trust, did not receive a benefit from 
                                                 
69
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.   
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the employer’s payment.70   Does the gratuitous nature of the payment make a difference 
for tax purposes? To find out, we now turn to a discussion of the assignment of income 
doctrine and its application in the gratuitous setting.     
2.  Assignment in the Gratuitous Context:  Earl and Corliss  
 
The assignment of income doctrine, one of the key concepts underlying the 
federal income tax, was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl.
71
   In an 
era before spouses had the option of filing joint tax returns, Mr. Earl legally assigned half 
of his earnings to his wife and claimed that he need only report half of his income on his 
tax return and that his wife should report the other half that was assigned to her on her tax 
return.
72
  The Court said this was not allowed.  Whoever earns the income must pay tax 
on it.  Therefore, Mr. Earl must pay tax on 100% of his income.  The assignment of half 
of such income to his wife, although legally enforceable, represents a gift.  In an oft-
quoted phrase, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that “tax could not be escaped by 
anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised…by which the fruits 
are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.”73   
In a subsequent assignment of income case, Corliss v. Bowers, the Court held that 
the grantor of a trust was taxable on the trust’s income even though title to the property 
                                                 
70
 See Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl:  How Echoes (and Metaphors) from the Past Continue to Shape 
the Assignment of Income Doctrine, in TAX STORIES:  AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX CASES 275, 299 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003) (noting that Old Colony Trust involved an 
assignment of income “to a creditor who has provided the taxpayer with value” rather than a gratuitous 
transfer and noting the argument that “[i]t is not the assignment alone that causes the income to be taxed to 
the employee, but rather the fact that the income was paid for the employee’s benefit”).   
71
 Lucas v. Earl, 282 U.S. 111 (1930).   
72
 See id. at 113-14.   
73
 Id. at 115.  Scholars have noted that this metaphor is often inapt, especially where the earner is not 
entitled to all the income.  For example, an associate at a law firm may earn fees in excess of her salary, but 
she is only taxed on her salary, not on the amount of extra fees she earned for the firm.   Cain, supra note 
70, at 276.   
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was held by the trust and the income was payable to the trust’s beneficiaries (the 
grantor’s wife and children) rather than the grantor.74  The grantor was unable to shift the 
income to the trust beneficiaries because he retained the right to revoke the trust.
75
  
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated that “taxation is not so much concerned with 
the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual 
benefit for which the tax is paid.”76   Combined, Earl and Corliss make clear that the 
person earning income or having control over income producing property is taxable on 
the resulting income.  As Holmes stated, “income that is subject to a man's unfettered 
command and that he is free to enjoy at his own opinion may be taxed to him as his 
income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.”77  If you earn income by virtue of working 
for it or via control over income-producing property, you can’t avoid paying tax on the 
income by assigning the earnings or property to another.   
A person not familiar with taxation might ask why the government should care 
who pays the taxes—so long as the taxes are paid.  Why should the government care 
whether Mr. Earl or Mrs. Earl paid the tax on Mr. Earl’s earnings or whether a trust 
grantor or the trust beneficiaries paid the tax on income from trust property, as long as the 
tax was paid?  The reason the government wants to ensure that whoever earns income 
pays tax on it, is that each of us has different tax attributes.  In our progressive tax rate 
system, if income shifting were allowed then taxpayers in high tax brackets could assign 
                                                 
74
 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 377-78 (1930).   
75
 Id. at 377.   
76
 Id. at 378.   
77
 Id.   
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their income to family members in lower tax brackets—thus reducing the tax.78   
Virtually everyone would end up being taxed at the lowest tax rate.     
The tax system’s use of the assignment of income doctrine to protect the 
progressive tax rate structure is necessary regardless of the taxpayer’s motives in 
assigning income to another.
79
  Tax avoidance need not be the rationale behind the 
assignment.  Mr. and Mrs. Earl, for example, likely did not have tax planning in mind 
when they entered into their contract to legally split Mr. Earl’s earnings.  In fact, the 
contract assigning income to Mrs. Earl was entered into in 1901, twelve years before the 
passage of the income tax.
80
  Nonetheless, the assignment of income doctrine applied to 
avoid shifting of income and to protect the progressivity of the income tax.   
3.  Assignment in the Charitable Context:  The Controversy over Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
Radio Broadcasts  
 
While both Earl and Corliss involved gratuitous transfers, neither involved a 
transfer to charity.  Nonetheless, assignment of income principles still apply to 
assignments to charity.   Indeed, the assignment of income doctrine was infamously 
raised in the 1930s in connection with First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt’s radio broadcasts.   
Mrs. Roosevelt agreed to do a series of radio broadcasts sponsored by Selby Arch 
Preserver Shoe Company.  Under the agreement, for each broadcast Selby paid $1 to 
                                                 
78
 See, e.g., Cain, supra note 70, at 279.   
79
 Id. at 279 (noting that agreements to assign income “should be ignored by the tax collector regardless of 
the taxpayer’s innocent non-tax avoidance motives”).   
80
 Earl, 282 U.S. at 13.  The speculation is that Mr. and Mrs. Earl entered into the agreement for estate 
planning purposes.  It effectively created joint property with rights of survivorship.  So it would make it 
easier for all of Mr. Earl’s property to pass to Mrs. Earl upon his death—without the need of a probate 
process.  Cain, supra note 70, at 285. For more on the Earl case and its impact, see generally Cain, supra 
note 70.     
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Mrs. Roosevelt and $3,000 to a charity, the American Friends Service Committee.
81
  
Since the transfer to charity was directed by Mrs. Roosevelt, assignment of income 
principles should have applied to require Mrs. Roosevelt to include the $3,000 in income 
and then (if she met the requirements) take a deduction for $3,000 transfer to charity.  At 
the behest of President Roosevelt’s political rivals, the House Committee on Ways and 
Means held a hearing about the taxation of Mrs. Roosevelt’s broadcasts.82  Assistant 
Attorney General Robert Jackson testified he had previously issued an opinion that 
Selby’s payments were not taxable to Mrs. Roosevelt:83 
One who earns a salary or wages or has income from invested property 
cannot assign that income nor order it be paid to a person or corporation so 
as to avoid tax merely by routing his income so as not to pass through his 
hands.  But this doctrine of constructive receipt of income cannot be used 
to create income when there is no income, and has never been used to 
justify a tax on services devoted to charity.  Mrs. Roosevelt declined to 
work for money and was only willing to serve for charity’s sake.  It was 
and is my opinion that such benefit broadcasts do not result in taxable 
income.
84
      
 
Jackson thus drew a line between assigning wages or other income and working for free 
yet directing where the refused fee should go.   So Jackson’s opinion would not apply to, 
for example, a professor diverting some his salary to a particular university fund but 
would apply to an adjunct agreeing to teach a class for free while doing the same thing 
(designating where the forgone fee would be used within the university empire).   
                                                 
81
 JAY STARKMAN, THE SEX OF A HIPPOPOTAMUS:  A UNIQUE HISTORY OF TAXES AND ACCOUNTING 324 
(2008).  Selby also paid a $1,000 commission to journalist Miles Lasker for each broadcast.  Lasker, in 
turn, sent $400 of the commission Nancy Cook—a friend of Mrs. Roosevelt’s.  Id.  While the payment of 
this commission raises assignments of income issues, I ignore them for purposes of this Article to focus on 
the transfer that was made to charity.       
82
 Id. at 324-25.   
83
 Id.  Jackson later became Attorney General and then an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.  Id. at 
325.   
84
 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 75.2.4 
(2010) (quoting Hearings, Joint Comm. On Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75
th
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess. 426 (1937)).   
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While Jackson’s opinion put Mrs. Roosevelt’s issue to rest, subsequent 
commentators have made clear that Jackson’s opinion was wrong.85  Under basic 
assignment of income principles, Mrs. Roosevelt should have been taxed on the income 
diverted to charity at her request.  As one commentator put it, if Jackson’s opinion were 
to hold up, then “we might each designate a few hours rendered to our employers for 
charity and those wages would escape taxation.”86   
4.  Assignment in the Charitable Context:  Giannini and Hedrick’s Interpretation of 
Giannini  
 
The courts had a chance to weigh in on assignment of income issues in the 
charitable context in the 1940s.   In Giannini,
87
 the taxpayer was the president of a for-
profit corporation and was being paid 5% of the corporation’s profits in lieu of salary.88  
Upon learning that he had earned nearly $450,000 under this arrangement for January 
through July of 1927, Giannini informed the corporation that he would refuse any 
additional compensation for 1927 and asked that the corporation “do something worth 
while with the money.”89  The salary savings from the refused compensation was 
approximately $1.4 million.
90
  The corporation donated these funds to the University of 
California to establish a Foundation of Agricultural Economics in honor of Giannini.
91
    
                                                 
85
 E.g., STARKMAN, supra note 81 at 325.   
86
 Id.     
87
 Comm’r v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1942).   
88
 Id.  
89
 Id. at 639.   
90
 Id.  
91
 Id.   
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The IRS claimed that Giannini had in substance been paid the $1.4 million and 
then donated it to the University of California.
92
   The Ninth Circuit, after reviewing the 
assignment of income cases (including Lucas v. Earl
93
), held that Giannini never 
constructively received, and did not direct the disposition of, the $1.4 million.
94
  It was 
the corporation, and not Giannini, that decided to donate the saved salary to the 
University of California.
95
  The corporation was in control of the funds, not Giannini.  
Accordingly, Giannini did not realize any taxable income when he refused the $1.4 
million in salary.
96
   
 In a later case not involving a transfer to charity, Hedrick,
97
 the Second Circuit 
held that an employee who refused the pension he had earned was nonetheless taxable on 
the pension payments that his former employer provided to him.
98
  The court explicitly 
applied the constructive receipt doctrine but also cited the Earl and Corliss assignment of 
income cases.
99
  The court noted that Giannini might be distinguished on the facts 
because Giannini refused his compensation before he had earned it and his employer had 
agreed to honor Giannini’s refusal. 100   In contrast, in Hedrick, the taxpayer had already 
                                                 
92
 Id. at 640.  The focus in the case was on the approximate $1.4 million and whether it was taxable income 
to Giannini.  The court did not discuss the possible deductibility of the subsequent transfer to the University 
of California.   
93
 See discussion at supra Part III.B.2.   
94
 Giannini, 129 F.2d at 641.   
95
 Id.   
96
 See id.   
97
 Hedrick v. Comm’r, 154 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1946).   
98
 Id. at 91.   
99
 Id. Earl and Corliss are discussed at supra Part III.B.2.   
100
 Id.  Presumably the Second Circuit, in Hedrick, interpreted the facts of Giannini as follows:  Giannini 
accepted the approximately $450,000 he had earned from January through July of 1927, but then 
(presumably in July of 1927) refused to take any further salary for the work he would do for the corporation 
for the remainder of 1927.  Thus, Giannini refused the approximately $1.4 million of compensation before 
he earned it.  It is not clear, in reading the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Giannini, whether the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the facts was correct.  Indeed, the Second Circuit itself detected some ambiguity 
in Giannini and noted that if it was not correct that Giannini refused the compensation before performing 
services, then it would refuse to follow the holding of Giannini.  Hedrick, 154 F.2d at 91.  (That is, the 
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earned the pension at issue (through his years of service with his former employer) and 
the former employer had not acquiesced to the refusal (the employer actually sent the 
taxpayer the pension checks).  The Second Circuit in Hedrick, in its interpretation of the 
Ninth’s Circuit’s opinion in Giannini, thus appears to have carved out an exception to the 
constructive receipt doctrine where compensation is refused prior to performing services.   
But it is critical to recall that, in Giannini itself, the court found that Giannini exercised 
no control over the disposition of the saved funds.   The combination of Hedrick and 
Giannini thus indicates that, to avoid assignment of income, the income must be refused 
prior to the performance of services and the taxpayer can have no direction or control 
over how the saved funds are used.
101
   
5.  Assignment in the Charitable Context:  Regulations and Rulings 
 
After Jackson and the courts had grappled with the issue, the Treasury finally 
weighed in on assignment of income in the charitable context in 1957.  And it did so in a 
manner that is hard to reconcile with Robert Jackson’s ruling in Mrs. Roosevelt’s 
situation.
102
   The key authority is the following regulation:  
The value of services is not includible in gross income when such services 
are rendered directly and gratuitously to an organization described in 
section 170(c) [a charitable organization eligible to receive tax-deductible 
contributions].  Where, however, pursuant to an agreement or 
understanding, services are rendered to a person for the benefit of an 
organization described in section 170(c) and an amount for such services 
is paid to such organization by the person to whom the services are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Second Circuit would likely have found Giannini taxable on the $1.4 million in refused salary if Giannini 
had in fact not refused it before he earned it.)   
101
 The constructive receipt and assignment of income doctrine are somewhat conflated in both Giannini 
and Hedrick.  Thus, it is hard to discern how far any “pre-services rendered” exception would apply and 
under what circumstances.  But it seems fairly clear that control over saved funds is what matters in 
assessing taxation (whether viewed through a constructive receipt lens or an assignment of income lens).   
102
 See supra Part III.B.3.   
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rendered, the amount so paid constitutes income to the person performing 
the services.
103
 
 
The regulatory language requires some unpacking.  First, the regulation validates 
that donated services do not produce taxable income (and thus do not result in a 
charitable contribution deduction) as noted in Part III.A, above.  Second, the regulation 
indicates that someone in Mrs. Roosevelt’s position would in fact be taxed on his or her 
forgone income.  Mrs. Roosevelt performed services for Selby (radio broadcasts) and 
then “pursuant to an agreement or understanding” Selby paid the American Friends 
Service Committee (an organization described in section 170(c)).  So, per the regulation, 
Mrs. Roosevelt should have taxable income equal to the amount Selby paid to the 
American Friends Service Committee.   Presumably, upon including the amount in 
income, she would be entitled to take a charitable contribution deduction as if she had 
paid the American Friends Service Committee directly.
104
   
The regulation provides guidance in situations like that of Mrs. Roosevelt but 
does not directly address the situation that is the subject of this Article.  Namely, a 
professor or other employee of a charity who forgoes salary under an “agreement or 
understanding” that the saved funds will be redeployed for a particular charitable purpose 
of the employer.  The regulation could be read to cover this situation if there was “an 
agreement or understanding” and the “organization described in section 170(c)” and the 
“person to whom the services are rendered” could be the same—that is, the college, 
university, or other charitable organization.  This would be straining the language, but in 
                                                 
103
 Reg. § 1.61-2(c).   
104
 Subject to the limitations on charitable contribution deductions discussed at infra Part III.E.  
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fact this is how it has been interpreted—at least by cautious college and university 
counsel.
105
   
Specific revenue rulings shed some more light on the meaning of the regulation.  
Revenue Ruling 58-495 involves employees who entered into an agreement with their 
employer to aid charity.
106
  The employees agreed to give up 5 hours of pay for charity 
and the employer remitted what it would have paid the employees to the designated 
charity.
107
  The ruling held that the pay for the 5 hours of income paid to charity by the 
employer was taxable compensation to each employee.
108
  This outcome of this ruling is 
not surprising, given that that the facts are similar to the scenario stated in the regulation 
itself.   
Revenue Ruling 79-121 says that an honorarium due to an elected government 
official for speaking to a national professional society that was paid to an educational 
organization at the official’s request is taxable income to the official.109  In addition, the 
official is entitled to a charitable donation, to the extent allowed by section 170.
110
   
Other interpretations of the regulation resulted in no imputation of income—
placing the transactions at issue in the no income/no deduction category.
111
  Revenue 
Ruling 68-503, for example, found that an entertainer who performed for no 
compensation at events planned, organized, promoted, and scheduled by a political fund-
                                                 
105
 See infra Part III.C.  
106
 Rev. Rul. 58-495, 1958-2 C.B. 27.   
107
 Id.   
108
 Id.  
109
 Rev. Rul. 79-121, 1979-1 C.B. 61.   
110
 Id.  In 1995, the IRS ruled that Revenue Ruling 79-121 was obsolete because it contained references to 
statutes that have changed. Rev. Rul. 95-71, 1995-2 C.B. 323. But the regulation on donated services that 
Revenue Ruling 79-121 was interpreting has not changed.  So, while Revenue Ruling 79-121 is no longer 
good law, its conclusion still appears consistent with the regulation it interpreted.       
111
 See supra Part III.A.   
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raising organization realized no income from their donated services.
112
  The political 
organization charged admissions to the events and used the funds in the organization’s 
activities, but no amount was paid to the performer.
113
  Note that the entertainer donated 
services directly to the organization benefiting—which makes the entertainer look like 
any other volunteer.  The Eleanor Roosevelt situation, in contrast, did not involve a direct 
donation of time to a charitable organization.
114
  Instead, Mrs. Roosevelt worked for 
Selby (the sponsor) who then paid the charity at Mrs. Roosevelt’s request.      
In addition, Revenue Ruling 71-33 found that a taxpayer who transferred all his 
interests in a manuscript (his memoirs) to a charity and then gratuitously assisted the 
charity in preparing the manuscript for publication did not realize any income from the 
charity’s use or sale of the memoirs.115   The situation can be distinguished from an 
assignment of income arrangement because the taxpayer essentially made an outright 
contribution of property (the manuscript)—entitling the charity to all subsequent income 
from the property—followed by a contribution of services (getting the memoirs ready for 
publication).
116
   
C. Current Practice In Higher Education       
 
As noted above, there is no specific ruling in the charitable context where 
employees of a charity volunteer time with their employer and are deemed to have 
imputed income.  But, by extension, the materials reviewed above show a great risk of 
income imputation where the employee is giving up a specific amount of salary and there 
                                                 
112
 Rev. Rul. 68-503, 1968-2 C.B. 44.   
113
 Id.   
114
 See supra Part III.B.3.   
115
 Rev. Rul. 71-33, 1971-1 C.B. 30.   
116
 See id.  See also Rev. Rul. 76-20, 1976-1 C.B. 22 (coming to the same conclusion under slightly 
different facts).   
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is an agreement or understanding about how the salary savings will be deployed in the 
charitable organization.  
Applying the above rules in the higher education context can be somewhat tricky, 
given the unique legal structure and internal political structures that can predominate.  
Most colleges and universities that are aware of this issue proceed cautiously, requiring 
that either donated time be included in income or allowing the “donor” absolutely no say 
over how the “saved” funds resulting from their volunteer work will be spent.117  Indeed, 
university counsels who have opined on the donated services issue conclude that income 
must be imputed, unless the employee disclaims all right to any income prior to rendering 
services and there is no binding agreement about how the savings will be used.
118
     
                                                 
117
 A graduate assistant spoke informally with executives at several large universities (or their supporting 
foundations) who confirmed that they take this approach.  (Notes on file with author).  This small, 
unscientific survey indicated that, perhaps due to the tax impediments, colleges and universities are not 
actively seeking donations of time from their employees.  (Being unable to include donated time in capital 
campaign goal reports was also a factor.)  One university used to actively seek donations of employee time 
and required that employees sign a contract (on file with author) waiving all right to determine where the 
salary savings would be used.  The university would then not include the forgone salary in the employee’s 
income.  But the university stopped this practice, in an abundance of caution, upon being audited by the 
IRS.  Because the donated time program was suspended, it never became an issue in the IRS audit.  Given 
that our informal survey showed little encouragement of donated services, it is doubtful that a full blown 
empirical survey would shed additional light on current practice.  The hope is that a well-crafted tax rule 
that removes some of the impediments to donating time might encourage donations of time by faculty and 
greater use by university development offices in taking advantage of this resource.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many faculty would be interested in donating time (especially towards the end of their 
careers) if they had a say over where the funds would go (e.g, a scholarship fund in honor of the faculty 
member’s family).          
118
 E.g., Campus Legal Information Clearinghouse, Q&A on Tax, at  
http://counsel.cua.edu/tax/questions/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). The Campus Legal Information 
Clearinghouse included two questions and answers regarding donated services:     
 
Donation in Lieu of Salary?  
 
Q: We pay emeritus faculty $7,500 per course to teach for us. One such retired professor 
wants to teach two courses, but only wants to receive $6,000 total ($3,000 per course), 
for purposes of Social Security. He wants the University to give the remaining $9,000 
that he would have received to our foundation's alumni scholarship fund. Any problems 
here with the 501(c)(3) status of our foundation or with the IRS generally? 
   
A: It is taxable income to the recipient (and reportable on the faculty member's IRS Form 
W-2 and subject to income/employment tax withholding) by this exercise of control and 
dominion over the payment. This assignment of income to the foundation/charity does 
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University tax counsel who advise against allowing donated services without 
imputing income have cause to take a conservative approach.   Colleges and universities, 
                                                                                                                                                 
not work to avoid the recipient's tax liability on it; the good news is that he may be 
entitled to a charitable contribution deduction (depending upon the status of the 
foundation). 
  
To avoid incurring the taxable income, an individual must disclaim any right to the 
income BEFORE any services are performed and the person vests and otherwise has a 
right to receive payment. Also, if the person would like the money to go to some pet 
charity or a particular purpose, the disclaimer should not make the payment contractually 
binding. For example, the individual could say he hereby irrevocably and forever 
disclaims any right, title or interest in the payment and, the person respectfully requests, 
but does not require, that the payment be made instead to XYZ charity. 
  
Answer courtesy of Sean P. Scally, University Counsel and Tax Attorney, Vanderbilt 
University 
  
Gift with Pretax Dollars 
  
Q:Can an employee make gifts to the university with pretax dollars, and only be taxed on 
the net amount received as income? 
   
A: The concept is that an employee earning, say, $10,000 [from] the University could 
reduce his/her salary to, say, $9,000, and the difference of $1,000 be a gift to the 
University. If legally permissible, those advocating this arrangement note that the 
employee would be taxed only on $9,000, but would not be entitled to a charitable 
contribution deduction for the gift amount, i.e., $1,000. You asked if this arrangement is 
legally permissible. 
 After undertaking such research and analysis as is necessary, we have concluded that the 
arrangement is not legally permissible, but rather is a legally impermissible assignment of 
income. As a general income tax principle, income is taxed to the person who earns it. I 
cannot, for example, assign a portion of my income to my son or daughter to take 
advantage of their being taxed at a lower bracket. I cannot assign a portion of my income 
to a needy relative or friend who may not otherwise have income. And, similar to what 
you have asked, I cannot assign a portion of my income to my church to take advantage 
of its tax exemption. 
 
In the example above, the individual employee earned $10,000 and even though he/she 
assigned $1,000 of that to the University, the employee earned, and is taxable on, the full 
$10,000. The individual would be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction of 
$1,000. Certain assignments are specifically authorized by statute, i.e., the authorization 
for employees to assign a portion of their income, pretax as salary reductions, to the 
University's pension plan as an employee contribution. There is no statutory or other 
authorization to allow pretax assignments for charitable gift purposes. The arrangement 
being proposed would be strongly resisted by the IRS and, if implemented, could cause 
the University to be subject to penalties and fines. 
  
Answer courtesy of Thomas Arden Roha, Esquire, Roha & Flaherty, Washington, D.C. 
Attorney Roha serves as tax counsel for The Catholic University of America.   
Id.   
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by their nature and because of their tax-exempt status, were, in the past, often left alone 
by the government and could engage in informal transactions (like allowing donated 
services without income imputation) without much consequence.  No more.  IRS scrutiny 
of colleges and universities has increased substantially in the past few years.  Indeed, in 
October of 2008, the IRS sent compliance check questionnaires to 400 private and public 
colleges and universities.
119
  Based on the questionnaire responses, and information 
available on Forms 990, the IRS began audits of more than 30 colleges and 
universities.
120
  The audits targeted executive compensation issues and reporting of the 
unrelated business income tax (the tax that nonprofits must pay on their commercial 
income).
121
   
While the audits were not aimed at donated services/assignment of income 
issues,
122
 the audits send a signal that colleges and universities are subject to scrutiny and 
should be scrupulous in complying with the tax law (including the law of donated 
services).  As one sociologist put it, “higher education is one of the last revered Western 
institutions to be ‘de-churched’; that is, it is one of the last to have its ideological 
justification recast in terms of corporatization and commodification and to become 
subject to serious state surveillance.”123 With scrutiny by the IRS the new reality, 
colleges and universities are likely to shun donated services unless income is imputed.
124
   
                                                 
119
 IRS Exempt Organizations Colleges and Universities Compliance Project Interim Report 1 (May 7, 
2010) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cucp_interimrpt_052010.pdf  
120
 Id. at 5.   
121
 Id.   
122
 See generally id. (not raising the assignment of income issue).   
123
 GAYE TUCHMAN, WANNABE U:  INSIDE THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY 41 (2009) (emphasis in original).   
124
 Keep in mind that the IRS can hold the employer (here the college or university) liable for any taxes that 
should have been withheld from the employee, but were not.  In addition, failure-to-deposit penalties may 
also apply, although waivers may be granted for if the failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful 
neglect.  The imposition of tax and penalties can get complicated and will vary by circumstance.  A 
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But taking the imputed income/charitable contribution deduction approach has negative 
tax consequences—as we are about to discover—sufficient to deter faculty 
volunteerism.
125
 
 
D. Justification for Current Rules:  Control and Horizontal Equity       
 
It all comes down to control.  The justification for treating some donated service 
situations as resulting in no income/no deduction (as discussed above in Part II.A) and 
others as resulting in imputed income coupled with a possible deduction (as discussed 
above in Part II.B) is based on control of the saved funds.  Volunteers in the former 
category control the services they provide, but do not control how the saved funds will be 
used.
126
  Volunteers in the latter category control both the services they provide and have 
a say in how the saved funds will be used.  Volunteers in the latter category are like 
donors of cash, and in theory they should be taxed as if they had given cash.   
An effective tax system should strive to achieve horizontal equity—that is, tax 
individuals in the same position the same.
127
  If horizontal equity is lacking, taxpayers 
may judge the tax system to be unfair, lose respect for the tax system, and perhaps not 
strive to comply with the law.  Lack of horizontal equity thus undermines the ability of a 
tax system to effectively generate revenues.   
The current rules on donated services appear to achieve horizontal equity between 
donors of cash and donors of time in most situations.   Assume Professor Pendant, who 
                                                                                                                                                 
detailed review of the penalty provisions is beyond the scope of this Article.  For more detail, see generally 
IRS PUBLICATION 15, (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE (2013).     
125
 See infra Part III.E.   
126
 See, for example, the discussion of the Giannini case at supra Part III.B.4. 
127
 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 41, at 89.   
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works for Metro-State University, donates $1,000 to Metro-State, designating that the 
donation help fund scholarships for business students.
128
   Pendant would have to earn 
income at Metro-State, which would be taxable (and subject to FICA) sufficient to 
generate a net amount of $1,000 and then he would take a deduction (if he gets past the 
limits on deductibility discussed below in Part III.E) of $1,000.  He would also have 
control over how the donation was used (scholarships for business students versus some 
other Metro-State program).  If Pendant instead donates time to Metro-State, and 
designates the use of the saved funds, then he is in the same position as if he had donated 
cash:  he has taxable income and (perhaps) an offsetting deduction.    If Pendant wants to 
fall into the no income/no deduction category in donating time to Metro-State, he can 
only choose the nature of his services (e.g. the class he will teach for free).  He cannot 
choose how the saved funds will be allocated.  While he is in a better position tax-wise, 
he is in a different position from a donor of cash because he has no control over how the 
cash resulting from his gift of time is used.   
Likewise, consider the following examples:   
Example #1:  Professor Overwhelmed works “overtime” without pay.  There is 
no imputed income in this case and no deduction.  In a sense, Overwhelmed has 
contributed something.
 129
   But the exact value cannot be quantified; only the salary 
                                                 
128
 The fact Pendant is donating to the same organization at which he is employed makes no difference.  
The cash donation could have been made, for example, to the United Way and designated for a particular 
United Way program (say, homeless shelters).  An employee donating cash to his charitable employer is 
treated the same as any other donor of cash.   
129
 Indeed, just working for a charity is in effect a charitable action, since the employee is likely forgoing a 
higher salary that might be available from a for-profit employer.  See David M. Schizer, Subsidizing 
Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L.REV. 
221, 257 (2009) (indicating that senior managers in nonprofit organizations and government are often 
personally committed to the cause of the organization and are thus willing to work for below-market 
wages).  The willingness of the employee to accept a lower salary in working for a charity might be 
because of altruism, but is likely more the “warm glow” that one receives from doing noble work for a 
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negotiated at arm’s length between Overwhelmed and the university can be quantified.  
Even if the value could be quantified, Overwhelmed would have no say over how any 
saved funds were redeployed in the university.   
Many professors would argue that they are already donating quite a bit of time to 
the cause.
130
  They have often nine month contracts,
131
 but end up working twelve months 
to get the job done and often work overtime.
132
  But a professor’s work redounds to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
nonprofit.  See Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2009) (indicating that 
“[j]ust as giving to a charity produces a warm glow, so too may working for one” and that warm glow is 
really “noncash compensation” that may well “lower the actual cost of wages for nonprofits”).  See also 
James R. Hines, Jr., et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1179, 1197 (2010) (“Although nonprofit managers are certainly motivated by money, they may have 
intrinsic motivation that generally requires fewer financial incentives for high performance than do their 
for-profit counterparts.  Nonprofit employees may be more loyal to their employers than for-profit 
employees, if, as is often alleged, nonprofits provide ‘more pleasant amenities on their job, such as flexible 
hours, more stable job prospects,. . .a slower pace of work’ or control over their working environments.”  
(internal citations omitted)).  This would fit neatly with higher education—tenure, a connection and long-
term shared sense of mission with the school, flexible schedules, and job stability.   It would be ridiculous 
to try to put a value on, and tax, warm glow and these intrinsic rewards, and so the tax system does not 
even try.   One commentator put the issue as follows:   
First, if consumption—or income—is ultimately a mental or psychological concept, the 
tax base no longer follows precisely from observable transactions. Rather, an accurate 
determination of tax liability on this theory would require knowledge of each person's 
capacity for pleasure, because identical objects purchased for identical prices would 
almost surely give rise to different amounts of psychic income in different psyches. There 
apparently could also be a kind of manna under this view, in that a pleasurable sensation 
arising without an increase in social product would presumably be income. The 
psychological nature of this concept plainly makes it unworkable as a touchstone for 
taxation, because it requires calculation of amounts that are totally unknowable.  
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1096 
(1980) 
Of course, in the higher education context, warm glow may be harder to identify and quantify in 
an “observable transaction”.  While there are for-profit schools that might offer more in the form of 
immediate or “upside” compensation (stock options, etc.), such positions also lack tenure or other forms of 
long-term job security.   Also, the effect of warm glow may be more easily discernible in certain disciplines 
where highly compensated for-profit work is available (accounting, law, sciences).  Nonetheless, 
individuals may seek out academic or charitable employment for a variety of reasons, despite the often 
lower pay—such as intellectual challenge, flexibility, etc.      
130
 See, e.g., JACQUES BARZUN, TEACHER IN AMERICA 29 (1944) reprinted in BIRNBAUM, supra note 1, at 
131 (“Teaching in America is a twenty-four-hour job, twelve months in the year; sabbatical leaves are 
provided so you can have your coronary thrombosis off campus”).   
131
 Martin J. Finkelstein, The Power of Institutional and Disciplinary Markets:  Academic Salaries in the 
United States, in PAYING THE PROFESSORIATE: A GLOBAL COMPARISON OF COMPENSATION AND 
CONTRACTS 318, 324 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds., 2012) (noting that most faculty are on nine or ten 
month contracts).    
132
 Well, I do anyway.  But maybe I am just a slow worker.  In any case, many faculty members work a 
great deal, devoting a lot of their “leisure” time to their professional activities. Yaroslav Kuminov, 
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benefit of the institution (and thus the students, community, and other stakeholders the 
institution serves) and to the benefit of the professor’s career.  The benefit to the 
professor’s career may not be in the form of cash, but via an enhanced reputation in the 
broader academic community.   
Early career professors, of course, must work more than their contracts call for—
in the hopes of keeping their job (i.e., attaining tenure).  This might be viewed more as an 
investment rather than a donation.  After all, tenure provides not only guarantees for the 
professor, but also an attachment between the professor and the institution.  The bottom 
line is it is often difficult to separate the selfish motives of professors from genuine 
concern for the institution to which they have devoted their labors.   Professors act as 
both business folks (in the business of being an employee) and as charitable workers.  
Drawing the line between the two can be difficult.   
Example #2:  Professor Dedicated works for City State University with a salary 
of $80,000.  He could work for Corporate University for $100,000.  We don’t impute 
$20,000 to him and consider it a donation.  We don’t try to measure Dedicated’s cost 
versus his value.    Perhaps he remains at City State out of a sense of mission.  Perhaps he 
stays for the intrinsic, psychic benefits of the job—freedom, flexibility, time off, etc.133  
He gets, therefore, essentially a tax benefit—in that he is not taxed on the $20,000 he 
                                                                                                                                                 
Academic Community and Contracts:  Modern Challenges and Responses, in PAYING THE PROFESSORIATE: 
A GLOBAL COMPARISON OF COMPENSATION AND CONTRACTS 331, 332 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds., 
2012).   
133
 Id. (noting that professors are often willing to settle for less than market pay for the unique working 
conditions and free-time that a university job provides).  These intangible benefits may become less 
alluring as they become more prevalent in jobs outside of academia—that pay more.  See id. at 339.   
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never earned.
134
  The $80,000 is the negotiated, arm’s length price that will be respected 
by the tax law.  
Example #3:  Professor Livewood works for City State University with a salary 
of $80,000 and tenure.  He could work for Corporate University for $100,000 without 
tenure.  We don’t try to impute $20,000 in income to Livewood as the intangible value of 
tenure.  But it is becoming easier to estimate the monetary value of tenure, as some 
schools offer salary premiums to faculty on multi-year contracts in lieu of the protections 
of tenure.
135
 In fact, at one least commentator has even suggested taxing the value of 
tenure.
136
   
Example #4:  Professor Entitled works for City State University with a salary of 
$80,000 and tenure.  He could move to Flagship State University and make $100,000 
with tenure, given current market values, his reputation, and a shortage of qualified 
people in his field. Entitled decides to stay at City State.  We don’t tax him on the 
$20,000 difference and call it a donation.
 137
 
                                                 
134
 Commentators critiquing recent calls for “for-profit charities” or L3Cs (new legal entities under state 
law that can both earn a return to investors and pursue a charitable mission at the same time) have 
identified an analogous situation:  organizations (nonprofit or for-profit) that forgo profits by pursuing a 
charitable goal receive an implicit tax subsidy even if their income is generally taxed:  “as is well known, 
the tax system effectively subsidizes any investments that produce subpar returns, whether or not 
undertaken with social goals in mind.  Stated another way, there is no tax on the pleasure that comes from 
making an investment that advances charitable goals, whereas the commercial alternative generates a return 
that the government taxes.  The tax benefits would be greater still if investors were permitted full 
deductions for their investments in social purposes, but investors nonetheless reap a substantial portion of 
the tax benefits available to nonprofits simply by virtue of not having to pay taxes on returns they have not 
earned.”   Hines, Jr., et al, supra note 129, at1189-90 (2010).  This is similar to the case here:  Professor 
Dedicated is giving up $20,000 in potential compensation, and is not taxed on it.   
135
 See Finkelstein, supra note 131, at 321.   
136
 James Lileks, Let’s Invent New Vindictive Forms of Taxation for Fun, Aug. 11, 2010, at 
http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Let-s-invent-new-vindictive-forms-of-taxation-for-fun.   
137
 In some disciplines, individuals are effectively donating their time by staying put.  Accounting 
departments, for example, often have “salary inversion” whereby the newest faculty member is likely paid 
more than the more senior professors.  This is because there might be money to hire new faculty at a market 
salary, but it is harder to tap into resources to bring current faculty into line with current market salaries.  
This is pretty rare—only affecting disciplines with shortage of new, credentialed faculty, such as in the 
accounting discipline.  Nonetheless, a senior professor could cash in on current market salaries by jumping 
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Example #5:  Professor Entitled works for City State University with a salary of 
$80,000 and tenure.  He could move to Flagship State University and make $100,000 
with tenure, given current market values, his reputation, and a shortage of qualified 
people in his field.  Entitled tells City State about the offer, and City State offers to 
increase his salary to $95,000 to keep him around.
138
  Entitled stays at City State.
139
  He 
is taxed on the $15,000 raise, of course, but not on the theoretical $5,000 he gave up by 
staying at City State.  
Example #6:  Flagship State University furloughs all employees, requiring them 
to take ten days “off” without pay.140  Since the furlough is required and the employees 
have no say over how the savings is used, there is no imputed income and no deduction.  
But if the furloughs are voluntary and the employees are giving up what they are entitled 
to under their employment contracts, income will be imputed.
141
   
                                                                                                                                                 
ship to another school.  (Indeed, we have all run into academic “gypsies” or “drifters” who do just that 
every few years.)  This is not practical for most people, given that changing jobs involves a lot of costs—
moving with a family, establishing a new reputation at the new institution, being at the lower end of the 
seniority list (which might not be that big of a deal—maybe your office won’t be as nice or you’ll be a bit 
further down the list for summer teaching preferences, etc.)  Still, it is possible, and quantifiable.  Yet, we 
don’t impute income for the forgone wages and treat it like a charitable donation.   
138
 Perhaps using a secret fund reserved to reward disloyalty.  See Dilbert Comic Strip, June 29, 1997.   
139
 Much to the chagrin of his colleagues. Professor Entitled is no doubt the first one to whine in the faculty 
lounge about how underpaid he is.   
140
 Technically, professors are not supposed to work on these days.  But they must.  They still have to 
prepare for classes, grade papers, advise students, work on committees, and conduct research.  So, 
professors on furlough are really donating their time (but must remain quiet about it).  Perhaps one situation 
where a furlough really does result in a reduction in workload is when the furlough involves shortening the 
semester by a week or so.  That does reduce some work.  But then you are short-changing the students (not 
that they’ll complain).   
141
 An ironic example in the non-academic setting involved the Idaho State Tax Commission not 
understanding the tax ramifications of taking voluntary furloughs.  In 2009 the State of Idaho required 
employees of the Idaho State Tax Commission to take furloughs.  The furloughs did not apply to the four 
Commissioners at the head of the Commission, since their salaries are set by the legislature.  The four 
Commissioners took furloughs anyway, in sympathy with their rank and file employees.  As it turned out, 
the sympathy furlough was in violation of state law, and the Commissioners were required to be paid the 
salaries and report them in income.  They were then free to donate the money to the state or another charity 
(or keep it).  John Miller, Idaho Tax Collectors Try to Take Pay Cut but Can’t, ASSOC. PRESS, June 23, 
2010, available at  http://www.kboi2.com/news/local/97023724.html.   
Recently, President Obama, in solidarity with federal workers facing furloughs, announced he 
would forgo $20,000 of his $400,000 salary.  Because the President’s pay is set by statute and cannot be 
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All of the above examples follow the arm’s length principle.  For whatever 
reason, the professor has decided to settle for less pay.  The tax law does not question 
these arrangements.    Also, in all of the above examples, the professor does not control 
how the cost savings from their volunteerism is used in the university.  Thus, these 
volunteers are on par with volunteers who, for example, spend the day raking up a park or 
volunteering with Habitat for Humanity.    
In contrast, volunteers whose compensation is negotiated at arm’s length but then 
is voluntarily surrendered—with the volunteers designating where the saved funds will be 
used—are treated like a donors of cash.  The assignment of income doctrine is triggered, 
and the volunteers have taxable income and (perhaps) a deduction.   By these lights, it 
appears that the current tax treatment of donated services achieves horizontal equity.  
But, as will be discussed below,
142
 this is not always the case.  Furthermore, just because 
the rules make some sense does not mean they should be beyond scrutiny.  As we are 
about to find out, the imputed/income deduction tax treatment often stifles volunteerism 
at colleges, universities, and other charitable organizations.     
 
E. Illustrating the Difference Between No Income/No Deduction and Imputed 
Income/Deduction—The “Wash Preventers”      
    
 At this point, a person blissfully unfamiliar with the intricacies of the tax law 
might reasonably ask, “What is the practical difference between the rules noted in Part 
II.A (no income/no deduction) and Part II.B (imputed income/deduction)?”  In either 
                                                                                                                                                 
changed during his term, the $20,000 he gives up is still taxable to him.  But, he is entitled to a charitable 
contribution for the $20,000 given to the federal government—a deduction the White House has stated the 
President will not claim.  Laura Saunders, Obama Won’t Deduct Returned Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2013.   
142
 See infra Part IV.C.   
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case, won’t the taxpayer end up in the same place—with no income and no deduction in 
Part A and income offset by a deduction in Part B?  Isn’t the imputed income/deduction 
scenario just a wash?   The answer is no.  The following describes the “wash preventers” 
in the tax law.  These wash preventers illustrate a basic tenant of tax planning:  
exclusions from income are normally more beneficial than deductions from income.    
1.  Taxpayers Need to Itemize to Claim a Deduction 
 
As previously noted, individuals can deduct charitable contributions only if they 
itemize deductions rather than take the standard deduction.
143
 In 2012, the standard 
deduction is $5,950 for a single filer and $11,900 for a married couple, filing jointly.  
Taxpayers with total itemized deductions, like charitable contributions, mortgage interest, 
real estate taxes, and state income taxes that do not exceed the standard deduction will 
opt to deduct the standard deduction.  Taxpayers taking the standard deduction, therefore, 
receive no benefit from the charitable contributions they make.  A faculty member who 
does not itemize and has donated services and been imputed income, like Flinty in the 
opening example, will not get an offsetting deduction.  In fact, only about one-third of 
taxpayers have sufficient deductions to itemize.
144
  Normally, itemizers live in high-tax 
states (like New York or California) or have homes with mortgages.  Taxpayers close to 
retirement, like Flinty, may well have paid off their mortgage and no longer itemize.  It is 
often faculty that are close to retirement, like Flinty, that are in the best financial position 
                                                 
143
 See supra note 7.     
144
 See Tax Policy Center, Tax Facts:  Type of Deduction 1999-2009 at   
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?DocID=392&Topic2id=30&Topic3id=34.   
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to volunteer their time
145—and yet are the least likely to itemize.  Volunteers subject to 
the general rule of no income/no deduction don’t have to worry about whether they 
itemize—since there is no deduction to begin with.   
But note that if a taxpayer donates a sufficient amount of time, the taxpayer may 
end up itemizing just on the basis of the charitable contribution alone.   This could occur, 
for example, where faculty members donate their full salaries to the institution.  That is, 
they are working for free—normally in their last year on the job.   If income is imputed, 
then presumably there would be enough of a deduction to allow the faculty members to 
itemize.  But such retirement-minded faculty will likely run afoul of the next wash-
preventer:  deduction ceilings based on adjusted gross income.   
2.  Charitable Contribution Ceilings Based on Adjusted Gross Income  
 
 Even faculty members who itemize may not be able to deduct the full amount of 
their salary donations.  Charitable contribution deductions are generally limited to 50% of 
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI).146 Amounts in excess of the limit may be 
                                                 
145
 See Rebecca Nesbit, The Influence of Major Life Cycle Events on Volunteering, 41 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1153, 1155 (2012) (noting evidence that people increase volunteering as they enter 
retirement and are more likely to volunteer during retirement than earlier in their lives).   
146
 See supra note 8.  The theoretical justification for the 50% of AGI limit is unclear.  Miranda Perry 
Fleischer has suggested a “dual-majority” theory to explain the limit, opining that the limit likely exists less 
out of concern for over-benefiting the wealthy (charitable contribution deductions do that naturally—since 
they increase in value along with the taxpayer’s income level and marginal tax rate) than to ensure that the 
wealthy don’t use their generous giving to completely wipe out their taxable income.  Without the limit, 
wealthy taxpayers could give away 100% of their income and avoid all federal income taxes.  Taxes pay for 
government services which presumably benefit society.  Donations pay for good works by charities that 
also presumably benefit society.  Society needs both government and charity.  Taxpayers can reduce their 
taxes to the government if they give to a charity of their choice.  This gives the taxpayer more say over 
exactly how they will aid society—by directing their funds to a school, a museum, a homeless shelter or 
some other charity they care about—rather than to the general coffers of the government.  But at some 
point this flexibility needs to give way for the need for the government to get tax revenue to carry out its 
functions (determined by lawmakers representing the majority).  So, wealthy donors are given some 
latitude to decide how their “society” money is spent—but only up to a point.  A 50% limit seems like a 
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carried forward and deducted within the next five years (subject to the 50% limit 
applying in each of those years).
147
  
AGI equals a taxpayer’s gross income (from wages, interest, dividends, capital 
gains, etc.) less a limited number of enumerated deductions (normally business-related 
expenses).
148
  The government uses AGI to gauge a taxpayer’s income level for purposes 
of limiting tax benefits (like certain itemized deductions and credits) to taxpayers below 
certain AGI thresholds.
149
  
While the AGI limit is unlikely to affect a taxpayer giving up part of their 
compensation (like Flinty in the opening example), consider the impact on faculty 
members donating their entire salary during their final year before retirement.  If the 
imputed income from the donation is the only item of income for the year, they will 
likely only be able to deduct 50% of the income as a charitable contribution.  They may 
even have difficulty deducting the rest over the five year carryover period if, as is often 
the case, they have low AGI after retirement since most of their income will be the form 
of pensions and (perhaps nontaxable) social security benefits.  Even if the faculty 
members could ensure enough AGI in the carryover period (for example, by taking more 
distributions out of their retirement accounts than is legally required), they still have a 
significant problem.  In the year of the donation, they must pay tax on about one-half of 
their forgone salary.  This creates a cash-flow problem.  The faculty member will have to 
pay the tax—perhaps via taking money out of savings or perhaps by reducing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasonable place to draw the line.  For further discussion on these points, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, 
Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. REV. 165, 168-69 (2008).           
147
 I.R.C. § 170(d)(1).   
148
 I.R.C. § 62.  AGI appears as the last line (line 37) on page 1 of Form 1040 and the first line (line 38) of 
page 2 of Form 1040.   
149
  For more on the impact of AGI on the service donations, see infra Part III.E.3.   
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contribution.  That is, the faculty member may need to exclude the tax bill on the non-
deductible donation from their donation.  This makes Flinty’s problem (from the opening 
example) seem like small potatoes—and ultimately is likely to prevent some faculty from 
volunteering their time in the first place.
150
  Indeed, they could save a lot of headache by 
just working for their normal salary and then donating as much as they could 
(economically) in cash over a period of time that would maximize their deduction.  That 
is, they might spread out the contributions over a few years to reduce the impact of the 
50% of AGI limit.  Volunteers subject to the general rule of no income/no deduction need 
not worry about the limit—since there is no income increasing their AGIs and no 
deductions to worry about. 
3.  The General Problem of Increases in AGI    
 
In addition to the specific 50% of AGI ceiling on charitable deductions, another 
wash preventer is the broader impact of imputed income on AGI.  As noted above, many 
tax deductions and credits are limited based on a taxpayer’s AGI.151   Donors of time may 
view imputed income as artificial increases in their AGI that trigger reductions in their 
tax benefits.   
One could argue that a time donor is no worse off because their AGI is the same 
as it would have been in the absence of the donation.  With the donation, the faculty 
member has imputed income.  Without the donation, the faculty member has an equal 
amount of actual income.  Either way, AGI would be the same.  The difference is really 
                                                 
150
 I have a couple of colleagues who had long spoke of working their last year before retirement for no 
salary and asking that the salary savings be used to establish a scholarship fund.  Knowing the tax 
ramifications—and the impact of the AGI limits—they are no longer planning to do so.   
151
 The list of AGI-dependent tax benefits is too long to be reproduced here.  A good example, however, is 
the Pease limits on overall itemized deductions discussed at infra Part III.E.4.   
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one of cash flow.  Without the donation, faculty members may have an AGI that limits 
tax breaks, but at least they have after-tax cash from their salary to pay their bills—
including their tax bills.  Faculty members donating their time, however, end up with the 
same AGI, but no after-tax cash to pay their bills—including their tax bills.   
A good example relates to Social Security benefits.  Social Security benefits are 
generally exempt from tax unless the taxpayer exceeds certain AGI thresholds.
152
  The 
thresholds start at relatively low AGIs ($32,000 for married couples filing jointly and 
$25,000 for other taxpayers).
153
  Donors at or near retirement—the ones in the best 
position to donate time—may be collecting Social Security benefits.154  Such donors 
would be sensitive to increases in the their AGI—which would result in a greater amount 
of their Social Security benefits becoming subject to income tax.     Although the same 
amount of Social Security benefits would be taxed with or without the donation, the 
donating faculty member may realistically only be able to donate their time because of 
having the Social Security income to provide sustenance.    If such benefits were taxable, 
it could make the cost of the donation prohibitive.   Faculty members of a certain age 
contemplating donating time would be choosing among 1) working for free and having 
taxed Social Security benefits, 2) working for pay and having taxed Social Security 
benefits, and  3) not working at all (retiring) and having nontaxable (or lighter-taxed) 
Social Security benefits.   Framing the choice this way makes options 1 or 3 more 
                                                 
152
 I.R.C. § 86.   
153
 I.R.C. § 86(c).   
154
 Keep in mind that there is no mandatory retirement age for faculty.  A faculty member in her 70s, for 
example, may be working full time and collecting Social Security benefits at the same time.  Such a faculty 
member would be more inclined to donate their salary—since they can use their Social Security benefits for 
day to day sustenance.   
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palatable than option 2—thus causing the general AGI wash preventer to stifle donations 
of time.    
4.  The “Pease” Limits on Itemized Deductions   
 
Effective January 1, 2013, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 resurrected 
and modified the “Pease” limitations on the overall deductibility of itemized 
deductions—including charitable contributions.155    In general, itemized deductions are 
reduced by the lesser of: (1) 3% of the excess of the taxpayer’s AGI over $300,000 for 
married couples filing jointly and $250,000 for single filers or (2) 80% of the itemized 
deductions otherwise allowable for the year.
156
   Because of the high AGI thresholds, the 
Pease limits are likely to have limited impact on professors or other employees of 
charities who donate time.
157
   Indeed, the Pease limitations are expected to affect fewer 
than the top 2% of households.
158
  Even if it applies in a particular case, unlike the other 
wash preventers, it probably won’t—standing alone—influence an employee’s decision 
whether to donate time.
159
  But it could, in some cases, increase the tax cost of donating 
                                                 
155
 I.R.C. §68.   
156
 I.R.C. § 68.  The AGI thresholds are for 2013 and will be adjusted for inflation starting in 2014. I.R.C. § 
68(b)(2).   
157
 In the donated services context, the Pease limits would be most likely to strike executives (like a 
university president), high-salaried professors in certain fields (like medicine or law), or professors with 
modest salaries with spouses with high incomes.    
158
 CHYE-CHING HUANG, ET AL., “PEASE” PROVISION IN FISCAL CLIFF DEAL DOESN’T DISCOURAGE 
CHARITABLE GIVING AND LEAVES ROOM FOR MORE TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 2 (CENTER ON BUDGET 
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, JAN. 29, 2013). 
159
As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has pointed out, except in very rare cases the Pease limits 
are based on the amount of a taxpayer’s income (AGI), not on the amount of their itemized deductions 
(including the amount they give to charity).  Id. at 3.   Since the Pease limit increases with income, not with 
deductions, it should not be a disincentive to give to charity.  See id.  But the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities did not analyze the Pease limits in the context of donated services—where imputed income 
increases both AGI and deductions.  Thus, taxpayers donating time and being imputed income may 
experience greater impacts on their Pease limits. Nonetheless, the impact of the Pease limits on donated 
services should be rare.  Since (let’s face it) faculty members normally make less than the threshold for 
limitation, I did not include the limitations in the numerical examples at infra Part IV.A.    
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time—just as it would reduce the tax benefit of donating cash.    The Pease limits would 
not affect donations of time that fall under the general rule of no income/no deduction, 
since in such a case there would be no deduction to limit.   
5.  Payroll Taxes  
 
Taxable imputed income is subject to state and federal income tax withholding, 
which must somehow be paid in cash.  But income tax withholding can be reduced if the 
employee files an updated Form W-4 to reflect the expected charitable contribution 
deduction.  What cannot be avoided, however, are the payroll taxes due on the imputed 
income.  There is no charitable deduction available to reduce or eliminate the income 
subject to payroll taxes.    
Under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), employees must pay 6.2% 
of their taxable wages to fund Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI/Social Security) up to a wage cap ($110,100 in 2012) and 1.45% of their taxable 
wages to fund Hospital Insurance (HI/Medicare) with no wage cap.
 160
  For 2011 and 
2012, Congress declared a payroll tax “holiday” and reduced the OASDI rate on the 
employee portion of the tax to 4.2% as an economic stimulus.  The holiday expired 
December 31, 2012, and so the OASDI rate returned to 6.2% on January 1, 2013.
161
  
Employers—including otherwise tax-exempt charitable employers like colleges and 
universities—are required to withhold the payroll taxes from the employees and remit it 
to the government and to match employee contributions.       
                                                 
160
 IRC §§ 3101-02, 3111, 3121-28 (Federal Insurance Contributions Act—including employee and 
employer portions of Social Security and Medicare taxes); §§ 3401-06 (withholding from wages).   
161
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, §601 (2010).  
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 Volunteers falling under the no income/no deduction rule escape not only income 
tax, but FICA assessments as well.  But volunteers with imputed income end up paying 
the FICA taxes and need to find a way to fund the required FICA withholding.  This 
might be enough to stifle the donation from ever occurring.   
If the tax law is going to impute income in the donated services context, it makes 
sense to impose FICA.   Income from services, after all, is the classic type of income 
taxed under FICA.  Indeed, wages are taxable under FICA when “they are actually or 
constructively received.”162   
One could argue that FICA is not so much a “tax” as a payment for social 
insurance (pension payments and medical care in retirement).  If viewed as an insurance 
payment, the only issue would be the cash flow problem of making the payment—since 
the payment is going to buy (in theory) additional benefits.  But, as discussed below, 
there are good reasons to view FICA as a true tax.
163
   
6.  A Possible Wash Preventer on the Horizon   
 
The wash preventers noted above are the ones most likely to create a hardship on 
the donating employee sufficient to stifle the donation.  As of this writing, another item 
may be poised to further dirty the wash:  a proposal to limit the tax benefits of itemized 
deductions to 28% for those with income over $200,000, regardless of the taxpayer’s 
marginal tax rate.
164
  This would further reduce the benefit of the charitable contribution 
deduction, leaving some income in the tax base that, in theory, should not be there.  It is 
                                                 
162
 Reg. § 31.3121(a)-2(a) (emphasis added).   
163
 See infra Part V.C.   
164
 CCH TAX BRIEFING, 2012 TAX POLICIES OF THE MAJOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, SPECIAL REPORT 3 
(Sept. 11, 2012)   
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unclear whether such a proposal will become law, but deduction limitations of one kind 
or another have been a frequent topic of conversation during the 2012 presidential race.  
Like the Pease limitations, the limit would affect donations of time involving imputed 
income and donations of cash.  But it would not disturb donations of time that fall under 
the general no income/no deduction rule—since there would be no deduction to limit.   
   
IV. THE CASE FOR RELAXING THE RULES 
 
This Part reviews the reasons to relax the imputed income/deduction approach 
when employees of charities donate time to their employers.  Part A provides some 
numerical examples, showing the negative impact of the current rules on donors of time.  
Part B reviews how the current rules discourage employee volunteerism at colleges, 
universities, and other large, complex charitable organizations, given the unique political 
environment in which those organizations operate.  Part C shows that the current rules 
can create horizontal equity problems.  Part D gives examples of analogous areas of the 
tax law where the rules have been relaxed.  Part E gives examples of analogous areas of 
the tax law where scholars have proposed the rules be relaxed. 
 
A. Numerical Examples     
     
This Part IV.A. provides examples to show the impact of the assignment of 
income doctrine on donors of time.  In doing so, these examples illustrate some of the 
wash preventers that have been discussed earlier.   
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Numerical Example# 1:  Professor Cranky teaches for City State University. He 
agrees to teach a summer course for no compensation and asks that the saved funds be 
used to fund a scholarship for art students.  Under a standard summer contract, Cranky 
would earn $10,000 from teaching the summer course.   Cranky earns his normal salary 
based on a nine month contract, but is paid his normal salary over twelve months under 
state law.  (So, he gets a regular pay check all summer.)  For simplicity, and to focus on 
the tax aspects, the impact of retirement plan contributions and other benefits that vary 
with salary level are ignored. Assume Prof. Cranky has not reached the OASDI wage 
cap.  Also, the impact of temporary payroll tax holiday is ignored.  Cranky is the 25% 
federal tax bracket.  State income taxes are ignored.    Cranky elects to itemize his 
deductions and his charitable contributions for the year will be less than 50% of his AGI.   
 Impact on 
Taxable 
Income 
 
 
Tax Cost 
 
 
Notes 
Income Added to 
Cranky’s Form W-2 
$10,000   
Payroll Taxes at 
7.65% 
 $765  Since Cranky is not getting any 
cash for his summer pay, the 
$765 will reduce his take-home 
pay from his normal salary.   
 
City State University will also 
need to pay an additional $765 in 
payroll taxes under the employer 
match.   
Charitable 
Contribution 
Deduction 
($10,000)   
Net Impact on 
Taxable Income  
0   
Federal Tax at 25%  0  
Extra Cost of the 
Donation to Cranky 
 765  
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In this example, Cranky is in the best possible position a donor of services can be.  
He itemizes and the only wash preventer at issue is FICA.  Even so, Cranky would likely 
get, well, cranky about all this business and simply donate cash.  In that way, he won’t 
see his normal take-home pay reduced and will be able to better manage the cash flow 
aspects of the donation.    The problem with donating cash is that once he earns the 
money—and sees it in his bank account—it is hard to be generous after the fact and 
follow through on the donation.  Things get even worse if Cranky is out of pocket income 
tax on the donation, as we see in the next example.    
Numerical Example #2: Same as Numerical Example #1, except that Cranky 
does not itemize:  
 Impact on 
Taxable 
Income 
 
 
Tax Cost 
 
 
Notes 
Income Added to 
Cranky’s Form W-2 
$10,000   
Payroll Taxes at 
7.65% 
 $765  Since Cranky is not getting any 
cash for his summer pay, the 
$765 will reduce his take-home 
pay from his normal salary.   
 
City State University will also 
need to pay an additional $765 in 
payroll taxes under the employer 
match.   
Charitable 
Contribution 
Deduction 
0  Cranky does not itemize 
Net Impact on 
Taxable Income  
$10,000   
Federal Tax at 25%  2,500 Since Cranky is not getting any 
cash for his summer pay, the 
$2,500 will reduce his take-home 
pay from his normal salary.   
 
Extra Cost of the 
Donation to Cranky 
 3,265  
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Cranky’s tax bill would go up (and this take-home pay on his regular salary would 
go down) by $3,265.  Prof. Cranky will be discouraged from doing this, since he might 
not be able to afford it.  He would experience the same result if he gave cash that he 
generated via his taxable salary. But then he would have more control over the cash 
flow—deciding perhaps not to give the whole $10,000 but only the after-tax amount or 
perhaps timing the cash donation in a year when he will be able to itemize.   
Numerical Example #3:  Prof. Overhill works for City State University for free 
his final semester before retirement.   His normal gross pay for a semester is $50,000.  
City State University has agreed to use the $50,000 to establish a graduate assistantship 
in the university’s center on aging.  Overhill has no other income from any sources and 
will live off of his savings.  He does not yet collect Social Security benefits.  The 
donation of his time will be his only charitable contribution for the current tax year.  
Assume (unrealistically) he has no other itemized deductions for the year.    For 
simplicity, and to focus on the tax aspects, the impact of retirement plan contributions 
and other benefits that vary with salary level are ignored. Assume Overhill has not 
reached the OASDI wage cap.  Also, the impact of temporary payroll tax holiday is 
ignored.  Overhill is in the 25% federal tax bracket.  State income taxes are ignored. 
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 Impact on 
Taxable 
Income 
 
 
Tax Cost 
 
 
Notes 
Income Added to 
Overhill’s Form W-2 
$50,000  Since he is waiving his entire 
salary, this would also equal the 
total amount on his W-2.   
Payroll Taxes at 
7.65% 
 $3,825 Since Overhill is not getting any 
cash for his work, he will need to 
withdraw this amount from 
savings and give it to City State 
University to remit to the 
government.    
 
City State University will also 
need to pay an additional $3,825 
in payroll taxes under the 
employer match (just as they 
would with a cash salary).   
Charitable 
Contribution 
Deduction 
($25,000)  Since Overhill’s only income is 
$50,000, that is also his AGI.  
Cash donations to charity are 
limited to 50% of AGI or 
$25,000.   
He can carry the rest forward.   
Net Impact on 
Taxable Income  
25,000   
Federal Tax at 25%  $6,250 Since Overhill is not getting any 
cash for his work, he will need to 
remit this to City State 
University.   
 
Extra Cost of the 
Donation to Cranky 
  $9,075  
 
So, it cost Overhill $9,075 out of pocket to fund the donation.  This cost is the 
same as it would have been had he given cash, but he could have better managed the cash 
flow.  Also, he may get some of the $6,250 in taxes back by carrying forward the $25,000 
over the next five years.  But he still has a cash flow issue initially.  Had he given cash, 
he could have spread the cash donations over a number of years to maximize his 
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deduction and avoid the AGI limits.
165
  This is probably not something that Overhill 
would want to do.  And he may be reluctant to give cash after retirement.  Still, for 
$9,075 or something less he gets “credit” and “warm-glow” for a $50,000 donation—
enough to get him invited to the big donor banquets and such—at least this year.  
This may not seem like much of a hardship—after all, these are the same results 
(although hidden) that he would get with cash donations.  While the assignment of 
income process depicted here ensures horizontal equity between cash donations and time 
donations, it has other horizontal equity problems—as will be discussed below at Part 
IV.C.     
 
B. Encouraging Volunteerism at Colleges, Universities, and Other Complex 
Charities     
 
“The university is a collection of departments tied together by a common steam 
plant.”166  
 
“In an area where heating is less important and the automobile more, I have 
sometimes thought of [the university] as a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held 
together by a common grievance over parking.”167  
 
At this point, it should be apparent that the tax law, while validly trying to prevent 
assignment of income, stifles the donation of time by employees of charities when there 
is an agreement about how the saved funds will be used.   It would seem there is a simple 
solution:  just take control of the saved funds away from the employee.  Have no explicit 
or implicit agreement about how the saved funds will be used.  If done carefully and 
                                                 
165
 Alternatively, he could elect to take part of his salary in cash sufficient to pay the tax, but this would 
reduce his charitable contribution as well.   
166
 Attributed to Robert Maynard Hutchins (former president of the University of Chicago) in GEORGE 
DENNIS O’BRIEN, ALL THE ESSENTIAL HALF-TRUTHS ABOUT HIGHER EDUCATION 30 (2000), reprinted in 
BIRNBAUM, supra note 1, at 185.     
167
 CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 20 (1963), reprinted in BIRNBAUM, supra note 1, at 185. 
(Kerr was a long-time president of the University of California).   
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truthfully, this should put the donating employee in the no income/no deduction 
category—avoiding all the tax limitations and headaches noted above in Part III.E.168  If 
an employee of a charity is truly charitably-minded/dedicated to the cause, he or she 
should be glad to help out without needing to direct the funds to a specific use within the 
charitable organization.   
But as anyone who has worked in the academic setting—or in any large, complex 
charity—can tell you, internal politics and budget priorities are constant worries.169  
Control matters.  The use of the redeployed funds matters.  If anything is darker than the 
specter of the tax law, it is the specter of faculty politics—especially when it comes to 
money.
170
       
Even among the most collegial faculty, disputes arise over funding.  For example, 
a cash-strapped accounting program may look askance when a graduate of the accounting 
program is induced by a slick marketing professor to fund an endowed marketing chair 
instead of contributing to the accounting program.   In such an environment, it is 
understandable that an accounting professor (like Flinty in the opening example) would 
want to ensure that his donations (in cash or service) are channeled into programs that 
benefit accounting students rather than the liberal arts, athletics, or other areas.  Likewise,   
                                                 
168
 See supra note 118 for university counsel advice to this effect.   
169
 See, e.g., BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE FALL OF THE FACULTY:  THE RISE OF THE ALL-ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNIVERSITY AND WHY IT MATTERS 8 (2011) (describing how the administration at one school devoted 
funds to establish a graduate college of business without consulting faculty—even faculty that might be 
expected to teach in the new college).   
170
 As Henry Kissinger has noted, “University politics are vicious precisely because the stakes are so 
small.”  BIRNBAUM, supra note  1, at 187.    See also Erik M. Jensen, Planning for the Next Century or the 
Next Week, Whichever Comes First, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 7 (2012) (presenting a hilarious 
story or “farce” about a fictional law school faculty meeting and the politics involved).   
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English professors presumably would want to see their donations benefiting their 
department or college rather than the business school.
171
   
The same concerns motivate volunteer adjunct faculty from the professional 
community.   A Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a local business, for example, may 
agree to teach a basic accounting course for free.  If the university had cut funding to the 
course the CFO is teaching, the CFO’s time itself benefits the department.  But, in theory, 
the CFO’s services should free up accounting department funds (say $3,000) that the 
college had allocated to the course but was not spent.  The reality is that perhaps the 
$3,000 will be swept into the general college budget when the funds are not spent for 
their designated purpose.
172
  The college or university will thus redeploy the funds to 
causes outside the department the CFO was attempting to support.  This may seem petty, 
but in these lean times this is the reality.  Internal budget and governance procedures may 
dictate how well these arrangements work.   These political issues are removed if the 
CFO is allowed to designate that the saved $3,000 is deposited into an account benefiting 
the accounting department.
173
  This is not possible under current law without taxing the 
CFO and then having him take a deduction as if he donated cash.  This seems like an 
unnecessary amount of hassle.
174
  
                                                 
171
 Similarly, outside donors of cash are well-advised to designate the specific program or project they want 
to support, rather than giving unrestricted cash.  See GINSBERG, supra note 169, at 216 (advising against 
unrestricted gifts “which will almost certainly flow into the coffers of the deanlets and improve the quality 
of food served during administrative retreats more than the quality of the education offered by the school”). 
Most professors would like to see the saved funds going to something worthwhile, like cancer research in a 
science department or a subscription to Tax Notes Today in an accounting department.    
172
 It would make life easier to claim that there was no imputed income if the amounts we paid for adjuncts 
were not so “one size fits all.”  If the salary wasn’t a flat $3,000 (regardless of whether the instructor is 
teaching astro-physics, international tax, or into to business), then it would be harder to settle on a specific 
number for income imputation.   
173
 At a state university, the academic department likely controls specific accounts at the university’s 
foundation which cannot be tapped by the dean or central administration. 
174
 But see infra Part VI.A regarding the possible use of gross ups to address this problem.   
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Because of the politics involved and the motivations of faculty members, it would 
seem that allowing generic donations would offer little incentive to donate services 
without the ability of some say in where those donations go.  Indeed, scholars have noted 
that volunteers enter into various types of psychological contracts with the charities they 
are assisting.
175
 Under one type of psychological contract, known as a value-based 
psychological contract, volunteers perceive that they are giving time to a charity in 
exchange for the charity continuing to support the specific programs or principles that 
motivated the volunteers to give.
176
  If a volunteer gives time and the charity later ends 
the specific program that the volunteer cared about, the volunteer will perceive that the 
charity has breached the psychological contract.
177
  Breach can lead to anger, frustration, 
and decreased satisfaction with the charity.
178
  A volunteer whose trust has been violated 
in this manner is unlikely to donate time or money to the charity in the future.  When the 
charity is also the volunteer’s employer, such a scenario could even poison the 
workplace.  Thus, Flinty in the opening example, the CFO as adjunct in the above 
example, and other faculty members would not be likely to volunteer time unless they 
could ensure the saved funds would go to designated uses without negative tax 
consequences.    
To get around these issues, and put the donation in the no income/no deduction 
category, there is no doubt subterfuge—wink and nod arrangements between donating 
faculty members and the administration.
179
  After all, if the administration wants to 
                                                 
175
 Tim Vantiborgh et al., Volunteers’ Psychological Contracts:  Extending Traditional Values, 41 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1072, 1072 (2012).     
176
 Id. at 1074.   
177
 Id.  
178
 Id. at 1073-74.   
179
 Similar arrangements are sometimes made with respect to expense accounts.  Faculty earning 
supplemental income (such as via an internal research grant or an endowed chair) sometimes have the 
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encourage volunteerism, it should be motivated to use the funds as the volunteers 
desire.
180
  But this hardly aids transparency and such arrangements reek of secret back 
room, faculty lounge, or deanery deals.  Such deals may have been more acceptable in an 
earlier age, but not at a time when universities have been “de-churched” and are subject 
                                                                                                                                                 
option of taking $x in additional taxable compensation or taking $x plus y if the amounts are placed into an 
account to pay for research expenses (books, travel, etc.)  The “plus” arises because the university saves 
money on benefits that go along with additional salary benefits (retirement contributions, etc.) when the 
funds are taken in a nontaxable form.  For this choice to avoid assignment of income issues, the amount 
placed in the “account” really cannot belong to the faculty member; the administration is free to sweep the 
account at any time.  While the promise of the account funds is normally honored, so long as the money is 
spent on bona fide business expenses within a reasonable time period, there is always the possibility that 
the administration will take the funds away in tight budgetary times (and I have witnessed this occur).  See, 
e.g., Allie Bidwell, At Marshall U., President’s Raid on Department Funds Sparked Ire, Then a New 
Approach, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 19, 2013 (reporting how central administration transferred 
balances from departmental accounts to a central university account to address budgetary issues).  The 
faculty must accept this risk to avoid assignment of income.  One could question whether the substance of 
these accounts is really compensation, but this issue does not appear to have yet hit the radar screens of 
colleges and universities or the IRS.  But see PLR 9325023 (ruling that a manager who forgoes future 
compensation in consideration of his employer’s agreement to reimburse expenses of an equal amount has 
made an anticipatory assignment of income and must include the reimbursement in income.)  Indeed, in the 
higher education context, tax advisors suggest that faculty forsake salary in favor of reimbursed expenses 
when the opportunity arises.  E.g., John A. Miller & Robert Pikowsky, Taxation and the Sabbatical:  
Doctrine, Planning, and Policy, 63 TAX LAW. 375, 406-07 (2010).   Engaging in some speculation, let’s 
consider the consequences if the IRS were to successfully argue that these expense accounts are in fact 
taxable to the faculty member.  My guess is that expense arrangements would cease and the faculty would 
simply receive the compensation in cash (rather an account).  Any business expense a faculty member 
incurs would be deductible as an unreimbursed employee business expense—meaning the faculty member 
would need to itemize and the deduction would only be allowed to the extent it exceeds 2% of the faculty 
member’s adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 67.   (So the “wash preventers” are worse here than is the 
case with charitable contributions.  See supra Part III.E.)   If amounts are still put into an expense account 
for the faculty member’s use (despite being taxable), no charitable contribution deduction (which is not 
subject to the 2% of adjusted gross income rule) would result.  This is because the account is earmarked for 
the “donating” faculty’s use—which indicates a lack of charitable intent and a lack of “indefiniteness of 
bounty.”  Indeed, it would be hard to see how the amount deposited in the account could be viewed as 
being given with “detached and disinterred generosity.”  See generally supra Part II for a discussion of the 
requirements for the charitable contribution deduction.  If amounts are still put into an expense account and 
are taxed, what happens if the funds are subsequently taken away by the university?  My guess is claim of 
right principles would come into play—allowing a refund of the taxes paid on the account.  See I.R.C. § 
1341.  (Again, this is speculation and would depend on the specific facts of how the account was set up and 
the circumstances under which it was taken away.)  A charitable contribution deduction upon the loss of the 
account would not be appropriate, since the loss would be forced (not voluntary) and thus could not be 
viewed as a “gift” given with “detached and disinterested generosity.”  While the expense account issue 
raises similar issues to donated services, it is worthy of separate analysis.  Therefore, further discussion of 
the expense account issue is beyond the scope of this Article.   
180
 Indeed, one of the anonymous reviewers of this Article pointed out that such wink and nod agreements 
are quite common—and “suggestions” about how saved funds should be used are almost always honored.  
Such arrangements obviously raise classic substance over form issues and colleges and universities would 
be well-advised, given the IRS’s increased scrutiny of higher education, to avoid them.   
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to more public and IRS scrutiny.  Furthermore, we faculty members are supposed to be 
modeling ethical behavior for our students, and wink and nod arrangements to avoid 
taxes and control funds are hardly the way to go about doing so.   
 
C.    Horizontal Equity Issues      
As discussed above in Part III.D, the current tax rules governing donated services 
do a fairly good job of maintaining horizontal equity.  But, in certain situations, singling 
out donating professors that are explicit and honest about how the saved funds should be 
spent violates horizontal equity as compared with other donors of time.  This occurs 
when control over the saved funds arises not by an agreement made between the 
institution and the employee, but by the inherent powers of the donor’s position in the 
university.   
For example, consider the increasingly common situation in which university 
presidents reduce their salaries in times of fiscal distress.
181
  If a president of a university 
takes a voluntary 10% pay cut when renegotiating his contract, no one questions that he 
has provided value to the institution, yet he has no imputed income.
182
 This is true even 
though as president, he likely has a lot of say over how the savings gets used in the 
institution’s operations.  He might direct it to a pet project, a favored department, a new 
                                                 
181
 See, e.g., Jack Stripling & Andrea Fuller, Presidents Defend Their Pay as Public Colleges Slash 
Budgets, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 2, 2011 (listing university presidents who have voluntarily reduced 
their pay).     
182
 The president would have imputed income, however, if he voluntarily donated a portion of a salary that 
he was already entitled to by contract.  Presidents sometimes do this when their compensation goes up, but 
the rest of the university employees have their wages frozen.  These “sympathy” pay cuts are normally still 
taxable.  For example, E. Gordon Gee, President of the Ohio State University, “used his bonus to finance 
scholarships and other university efforts” in fiscal 2009-10.   Id.   Presumably this resulted in taxable 
income to Mr. Gee and then a charitable contribution deduction.  See supra note 141 (for a similar situation 
involving the leaders of the Idaho State Tax Commission).   
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program he is keen on, etc.  He, the donor, is in control of the funds not because there 
were strings attached to his donation, but because he is the president.       
A similar result occurs when a president negotiates her salary, perks, and working 
conditions.  Perhaps she gets a “slush” fund to use for university expenses at her 
discretion—perhaps to fund pet projects and unexpected opportunities.  No one imputes 
that income to her even if she could have negotiated for a higher salary in the absence of 
the slush fund.  The president avoids imputed income, and has effectively made a 
donation to the university, the use of which she controls.   
When those who control the budget donate their time, they control how the funds 
will be used.  This means that such individuals are not on par with those who donate time 
and don’t have control over budgetary matters.   Unlike university leaders, faculty 
members who donate their time and want to fall into the no income/no deduction 
category have no control over how the saved funds will be used.  This creates a 
horizontal equity problem and indicates that some relaxation of the law of donated 
services may be in order.    
A similar horizontal equity problem occurs between employees of small charities 
with focused missions and large charities with multiple programs and layers of 
administration.  Employees of a homeless shelter, for example, who reduce their salary in 
times of need know where the money is going—to help the homeless.  In contrast, 
employees at larger charities with multiple programs, such as the Red Cross or a college 
or university, can never be sure where the funds resulting from their work ends up.  
Allowing some relaxation would restore horizontal equity between these two groups.   
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D.   Precedents—Other Examples of Relaxed Donation Rules    
Relaxed rules for donated earnings are not unprecedented.  This Part presents 
examples of where the tax law has been relaxed when it comes to donations to charity. 
First, there is the donation of leave time.  Second is the donation of employer matching 
contributions.  Third is the donation of certain prizes and awards.    Fourth is the donation 
of certain distributions of individual retirement accounts.  Fifth is the special rule for 
members of religious orders who have taken a vow of poverty.   
1.  Donation of Leave Time 
 
Some employers allow their employees to donate their accrued sick, vacation, or 
leave time to charity.  Generally, the donating employee would recognize income equal 
to the cash value of the leave under the assignment of income doctrine.
183
  Presumably, 
the donating employee would then be allowed a charitable contribution deduction for the 
amount included in income.
184
     
But, on occasion, the IRS will relax these rules in order to encourage donations of 
leave time in hardship situations.  Most recently, in the wake of Hurricane Sandy (which 
hit the northeast in October of 2012) the IRS issued Notice 2012-69,
185
 explaining the tax 
treatment when employees forgo vacation, sick, or personal leave in exchange for cash 
                                                 
183
 See supra Part III.B.   A similar assignment of income problem arises when employees are allowed to 
donate their unused sick or vacation time to a fellow employees who need additional leave, but have 
exhausted their own leave time and will suffer financially if forced to take unpaid leave. IRS Letter Ruling 
2007720017 notes that such arrangements would normally generate taxable compensation income to the 
donating employee equal to the cash value of the donated leave.  But there are exceptions for leave sharing 
plans where the leave is donated to employees with personal or family medical emergencies (Rev. Rul. 90-
29, 1990-1 C.B. 11) or who are victims of a major disaster as declared by the President (Notice 2006-59, 
2006-2 C.B. 60).  If the employer leave-sharing plan meets one of the exceptions, then the donating 
employee will neither recognize taxable compensation income nor get a deduction upon donating leave.    
184
 Subject to the wash preventers discussed at supra Part III.E.   
185
 2012-51 IRB 712.   
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payments their employer makes to charities that aid the victims of the hurricane.    
Specifically, the IRS will not treat the forgone benefits as constructive receipt of gross 
income or wages for the employees and will not view the cash donation made by the 
employer as income to the employees if the donations are made to qualified charitable 
organizations for the relief of victims of Hurricane Sandy before January 1, 2014.
186
  
Under this approach, the employee will not be allowed a deduction for the forgone 
benefits, but will have no imputed income.  Accordingly, the employee effectively gets to 
deduct the benefits donate via this exclusion.  Thereby, FICA taxes are avoided, along 
with the charitable deduction limitations.  Notably, the IRS provided this relief “in view 
of the extraordinary damage and destruction caused by Hurricane Sandy.”187   The IRS 
had previously issued such relaxed rules when “extreme need” dictated, such as after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
188
   
The donation of leave time such as this shows that it is not unprecedented to allow 
employees to donate to charity by forgoing earned income.  However, the connection to 
donated services by employees of charities is not perfect.  Donated leave involves 
donations for a specific cause (here, hurricane relief) rather than a blanket license to 
donate.  Second, the relief is provided in the wake a specific disaster rather than a general 
problem (lower funding for education or charity in general).  Third, the relief is provided 
to all employers offering such a plan—whether nonprofit or for-profit.  In contrast, 
relaxing the assignment of income rules for donated services would only involve 
employees of charities.   
                                                 
186
 Id.  
187
 Id.   
188
 See id.   
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2.  Employer Matching Contributions  
 
Some employers offer an employee benefit whereby they agree to match 
donations the employee makes to a charity.  In general, employer matching contributions 
are not considered compensation income to the employees because the employees “are 
merely performing administrative duties for the corporation by suggesting specific 
qualified recipient organizations.”189  The matching contributions are considered 
charitable contributions by the employer, rather than by the employee.
190
   
The result of the matching contribution tax rules is that the employee has no 
income and no deduction from the employer’s matching contribution.    This result is 
similar to the no income/no deduction treatment of donated services that obtains when 
there are no assignment of income issues.  Why are there no assignment of income issues 
when it comes to matching contributions?   The employee picks the charity, presumably 
can designate how the donation will be used within the charity’s operations, and is 
getting an employee benefit (something that would normally be taxable as compensation 
absent a specific exclusion in the Code) via the employer match.  This appears to be no 
different from a professor donating time to a university and asking the university to 
allocate the saved funds to a particular unit or operation of the university.  Yet, 
assignment of income principles are not applied in the case of the matching contributions 
but likely are applied in the case of the professor’s donated services.  The difference 
                                                 
189
 Rev. Rul. 67-137, 1967-1 C.B. 63. See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39877, Sept. 8, 1992 (finding no income 
to employees where an employer donates an amount to a charity of the employee’s choosing equal to the 
amount the employee donated to the employer’s Political Action Committee in the previous year). 
190
 Rev. Rul. 67-137, 1967-1 C.B. 63.  A similar result occurs when shareholders control a corporation’s 
choice over which organizations will receive its charitable donations.  The shareholders do not recognize a 
constructive dividend as a result of the corporate donations unless the shareholders receive a property or 
economic benefit in return.  Knott v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 681 (1977); Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125.   
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between the two, in the eyes of the IRS, is that the latter involves a situation in which the 
“donation” is made “in return for specific and identifiable services [the professor’s 
teaching of a particular course], so that the payment represents a mere assignment of 
income.”191   
The distinction between matching donations and service donations may be easy to 
identify, but it is questionable whether they are, in substance, different enough to call for 
radically different tax results.   
      
3.  Donation of Certain Prizes and Awards  
 
Generally, prizes and awards are taxable to the recipient.
192
  An exception is 
provided for prizes and awards which are “made primarily in recognition of religious, 
charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement” if the recipient 
did not take any action to apply for the award, is not required to provide substantial future 
services in order to receive the award, and the prize or award is transferred by the payor 
to a governmental unit or charitable organization selected by the recipient.
193
  In the 
absence of this exception, presumably the recipient would have taxable income and then 
would be able to deduct any subsequent contribution of the proceeds to charity—subject 
to the wash preventers discussed above in Part III.E.   
Thus, this exception is another example of where the tax law turns off the 
assignment of income concept and puts the recipient of the income in the no income/no 
                                                 
191
 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39877, Sept. 8, 1992. 
192
 I.R.C. § 74(a).   
193
 I.R.C. § 74(b).   
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deduction category.  The assignment of income doctrine is cast aside, despite the fact that 
the award recipients control the direction of the funds to specific charities of their 
choosing.  Indeed, President Barack Obama used this exception when he received the 
2009 Nobel Peace Prize.
194
   He directed the Norwegian Nobel Committee to split the 
prize amount among ten different charities—even going so far as to designate, in broad 
terms, how the charities were to use the funds.
 195
  By complying with the exception, 
President Obama did not need to recognize any taxable income from the Nobel Prize and 
did not claim any charitable contribution deductions for the transfer of the prize to the 
designated charities.   
While this exception provides another example of ignoring assignment of income 
in the charitable context, it does not neatly fit within the fact pattern of donated services.  
First, the exception is very narrow,
196
 and cannot be used in the case of awards provided 
by an employer to an employee.
197
  Second, the exception relates to awards for work 
done in the past, not work done concurrently with the donation (as is the case with 
donated services).  Third, donated services reflects earned income (subject to 
                                                 
194
 See Portion of the President and First Lady’s returns related to the Nobel Prize (PDF), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/president-obama-2010-nobel-charity.pdf .   
195
 See id.  The charities with the amounts and designations were:  Fisher House Foundation, Inc. 
($250,000, program expenses), Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund of the Clinton Foundation ($200,000 plus any 
remaining funds, program expenses for the Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund), American Indian College Fund 
($125,000, scholarships), Appalachian Leadership and Education Foundation ($125,000, program 
expenses), College Summit ($125,000, program expenses), The Posse Foundation ($125,000, program 
expenses), Hispanic Scholarship Fund ($125,000, scholarships), United Negro College Fund ($125,000, 
scholarships), Africare ($100,000, program expenses), and Central Asia Institute ($100,000, program 
expenses).   
196
 Indeed, it seems to have been tailor made for the Nobel Prize—where a university professor can donate 
the award to his or her university.  See Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (noting the exception can apply to the Nobel Prize 
or the Pulitzer Prize).  The university would presumably have an incentive to direct the funds back to the 
professor’s department or lab, allowing the professor the use of the funds for his or her work while helping 
retain the prestigious, award-winning professor on the faculty.  For more on the workings of the exception 
in the context of the Nobel Prize, see Bridget J. Crawford & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, The Tax Man Wins 
the Nobel Prize, TAX NOTES, Dec. 12, 2011, at 1421.   
197
 Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (indicating that the exclusion does not apply to “prizes or awards from an employer to 
an employee in recognition of some achievement in connection with his employment”).   
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employment taxes) while awards generally are not subject to employment taxes.
198
  Thus, 
the exclusion for awards transferred to charity does not provide a FICA tax benefit, since 
the award would not have been subject to FICA tax in the first place.  The award 
exclusion does, however, remove the other wash preventers discussed above in Part 
III.E.
199
    
4.  Charitable Distributions from Individual Retirement Accounts  
 
A temporary provision of the tax law allows individuals aged 70 ½ or older to 
transfer up to $100,000 per year in otherwise taxable distributions from their individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs) to charity without incurring any taxable income.
200
  While 
taxpayers using this provision recognize no income from the distribution, they also are 
denied a deduction for the donation.
201
  Thus, taxpayers using this provision are like a 
service donor in the no income/no deduction category.  They get to pick the charity they 
support—and the specific activity of the charity they support—yet avoid income and 
                                                 
198
 This assumes that the awards are not provided as compensation for services.  That is they are 
“unearned.”  This also assumes that the employer did not provide the award (since taxable awards provided 
by employers are subject to FICA).  But this will not be an issue, since employer awards are not eligible for 
the exclusion.  See supra note 197.    
199
 Another point should be noted.  The current law exclusion for awards transferred to charity originally 
was a complete exclusion for such awards—whether or not the awards were donated to charity.  The rule 
was changed to require a transfer to charity for exclusion as part of the base-broadening approach of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986.  See THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 30-38 (1987).  By adding the requirement that the award 
be donated to charity, the exclusion was greatly narrowed.  In contrast, this Article is proposing expanded 
exclusions in the case of donated services.   
200
 I.R.C. § 408(d)(8).   Unless extended, this provision, first put into the law in 2006, expires (as of this 
writing) on December 31, 2013.  I.R.C. § 408(d)(8)(F).   The age of 70 ½ years is significant because that is 
the age at which individuals are required to begin withdrawing taxable funds from their individual 
retirement accounts.  
201
 I.R.C. § 408(d)(8)(E).   
 74 
 
most of the wash preventers noted above.
202
  This IRA provision is expected cost the 
Treasury $1.28 billion if extended through 2022.
203
     
The IRA provision is hardly a perfect model for relaxing the assignment of 
income rules in the donated services context.  First, because this is a temporary provision 
of the tax law that only applies to individuals over age 70 ½ with means sufficient to not 
need some of the funds in their IRAs, it is quite narrow.  Relaxing the rules in the donated 
services context would have much wider application.  Second, the IRA provision does 
not result in a forgiveness of payroll taxes.  The income being transferred from the IRA 
to charity is most likely a mix of earned income (which was already subject to payroll 
taxes when earned) and accrued investment income (which is not subject to payroll taxes 
in any event).
204
   But an effective relaxation of the assignment of income rules for 
donated services would need to provide relief from payroll taxes.  In the case of the IRA, 
the payroll taxes were paid years ago and do not present a cash flow problem at the 
distribution to charity.   With donated services, the payroll taxes are due along with the 
imputed income—creating a salient tax barrier to the donation.  Despite the differences, 
the IRA relaxation provision at least provides a precedent for having the tax law get out 
of the way of charitable contributions.   
 
 
 
                                                 
202
 See supra Part III.E.  Notably, the payroll tax wash barrier is not eliminated, as discussed below.    
203
 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 8, THE “AMERICAN TAXPAYER 
RELIEF ACT OF 2012,” AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON JANUARY 1, 2013 4 (JCX-1-13, JAN. 1, 2013).  
204
 Well, if one ignores the new Medicare Contribution Tax on investment income of high-AGI taxpayers, 
which is beyond the scope of this Article.   
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5.  Income Earned by Members of Religious Orders Who Took a Vow of Poverty 
 
Members of religious orders who take a vow of poverty usually agree to turn over 
all of their earnings to the order.  Such promises are legally enforceable.
205
  Normally, 
assignment of income principles would require the members to pay taxes on their 
earnings, even though they have been legally assigned to their order.
206
  But when 
members work for their church or an affiliated organization, they are considered agents of 
the order and the salary that is remitted to the order is not taxable to the member who 
earned it.
207
  In contrast, the general assignment of income rule applies when members 
work for another employer—one that is not their church or an affiliated organization.208  
In that case, members are taxed on their salary even though the wages are turned over to 
the order.
209
   
The exemption for wages earned by vowed religious who work for the order or an 
affiliated organization and turn over their income to the order seems to fit neatly with 
professors donating their time to a college or university.  In both cases, the worker is 
                                                 
205
 Samira Alic Omerovic, Improper Taxation of the Vowed Religious:  How Glenshaw Glass Principles 
Can Reestablish Horizontal Equity, 51 B.C.L. Rev. 1247, 1257 (2010) (reviewing Supreme Court cases 
finding that vows of poverty are legally enforceable). 
206
 See supra Part III.B.   
207
 Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26.   
208
 Perhaps one might think of an American version of Fraulein Maria being dispatched by the Abbey to 
work as a governess for the Von Trapp children, with the Captain remitting Maria’s fee to the Mother 
Abbess.  See THE SOUND OF MUSIC (20th Century Fox 1965).   Although Maria had not yet taken her final 
vows to become a nun, she did report that when she joined the Abbey all her worldly goods were given to 
the poor.  Except, that is, for the clothing she was wearing—which the poor did not want.  See id.   
209
 Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26.  For a review of the case law in this area, see Omerovic, supra note 
205, at 1255-66.   Omerovic opines that the government applies the assignment of income doctrine to 
vowed religious who work for outside employers to combat “personal church” tax avoidance schemes. Id. 
at 1258.  “The schemes involved protesters becoming ordained as ministers of mail order churches, taking 
vows of poverty, assigning their income to the fictitious churches, and then receiving access to this income 
for living expenses.”  Id.  Omerovic notes that undercover police officers are not taxed on the income they 
earn and turn over to the police department while undercover—and that members of religious orders who 
have taken a vow of poverty should be afforded similar tax treatment since they—like the police officers—
have no dominion and control over the wages they earn. Id. at 1250.        
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essentially turning over their wages to their charitable employer or an affiliate of their 
charitable employer.
210
  Of course, the analogy is not perfect.  Professors, unlike the 
vowed religious, have more control over whether they take salary or donate time.  The 
vowed religious agree to give up their income for life; a professor agrees on a case by 
case, course by course basis.  Although some might say that professors take a vow of 
poverty just by being in the professorate.
211
   
 
E. Other Relaxation Proposals    
This Part IV.E will discuss proposals made by scholars to relax the normal 
charitable contribution rules in other contexts.  First is a proposal to allow the donation of 
unused flexible spending accounts to charity free of tax consequence.  Second is a 
proposal to allow an exclusion for lottery winnings given to charity.  These two proposals 
simply turn-off the assignment of income doctrine and allow taxpayers to exclude income 
that is transferred to charity.
212
     
 
                                                 
210
 In the case of the professor, the wages are turned over to their university or a foundation that supports 
the university.  See the discussion of university/foundation relationships at supra note 17 and 
accompanying text.  As for the similarity between being a member of the professoriate and being a member 
of a religious order, see supra note 123 and accompanying text (regarding the de-churching of higher 
education).  Presumably religious orders have not been de-churched—yet.   
211
 I used to joke that, as a professor at a state university, I was on a “fixed income” (raises are rare).  I 
stopped saying that when I found Idaho State Board of Education Policy § II.G.1.c., indicating that tenured 
and untenured faculty salaries are not guaranteed from year to year; the salaries may be “adjusted” because 
of financial exigency or through furlough or work hour adjustments.  Perhaps adjusted to zero?  Now I am 
glad to have maintained a fixed income.   
212
 Other proposals, not reviewed in detail here, go further and advocate an exclusion from income and a 
deduction for donated services.  As discussed at supra Part III.A, allowing both exclusion and deduction 
provides a double tax benefit to volunteers.  See, e.g., Alice M. Thomas, Re-envisioning the Charitable 
Deduction to Legislate Compassion and Civility:  Reclaiming Our Collective and Individual Humanity 
Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269 (2010)(calling for a deduction or 
refundable tax credit for time given to charity or in helping individuals directly—assuming verification—
and capped at $2,000 per individual per year).  The relaxation proposals suggested in this Article are more 
modest, only calling for the partial shut-off of the assignment of income doctrine and only for employees of 
charitable organizations. (See infra Part V.A).       
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1.  Donation of Unused Healthcare Flexible Spending Accounts 
 
Adam Chodorow has proposed that taxpayers be allowed to donate their unused 
Flexible Spending Account (FSA) balances to charity without assignment of income 
consequences.
213
   FSAs allow employees to put aside a portion of their salary—capped 
at $2,500 per year
214—in an account which can be used to pay for out-of-pocket medical 
expenses.
215
  Amounts contributed to an FSA are exempt from income and payroll 
taxes.
216
  But an employee must spend the funds in the FSA on qualified medical 
expenses by the end of the plan year or forfeit any unused amounts left in the FSA.
217
  
Chodorow suggests that, rather than forfeiting the unused FSA balance, employees 
should be allowed to donate it to charity.
218
  Under Chodorow’s proposal, an employee 
who donated their unused FSA balance would realize no income and have no 
deduction.
219
  Since the original contribution to the FSA was excluded from income, the 
employee would, in effect, get a 100% deduction for the amounts that went to charity 
without worrying about the wash preventers discussed above.
220
   
Chodorow’s proposal is a good, but imperfect match with the donated services 
relaxation proposals suggested in this Article.
221
  In both cases, earned income is 
diverted, in an income tax and payroll tax-free manner, to charity.   In both cases, the 
                                                 
213
 Adam Chodorow, Charitable FSAs:  A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and Charitable Giving Tax 
Provisions, 2011-4 BYU L.REV. 1041 (2011).   
214
 I.R.C. § 125(j).  The $2,500 limit is for 2013 and will be adjusted for inflation in future years.  Id.   
215
 Prop. Reg. § 1.125-5.   
216
 See I.R.C. § 105 (employer reimbursements of employee medical costs excluded from taxable income); 
I.R.C. § 125 (allowing health benefits to be offered via cafeteria plans); Prop. Reg. 1.125-5 (including 
FSAs within the cafeteria plan structure); I.R.C. § 3121(a)(5)(G) (excluding amounts paid under a cafeteria 
plan from wages).    
217
 Prop. Reg. 1.125-5 (c) (“use-or-lose rule”).   
218
 Chodorow, supra note 213, at 1043.   
219
 Id. at 1075.   
220
 See supra Part III.E.   
221
 See infra Part V.A.   
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employee would get to designate the cause to which their funds would be directed.
222
  
Chodorow’s proposal is both narrower and broader than the donated services proposal.  It 
is narrower because it has a built-in limitation—the maximum amount allowed in a health 
FSA ($2,500).  There is no such built-in limit in the donated services context—although I 
will suggest some possible limits below in Part V.A.  It is broader because it would 
encompass all employees who work at companies with FSAs.  By contrast, the donated 
services proposal would apply only to employees of charities. 
Chodorow’s proposal arguably will not cost the Treasury much revenue.  
Taxpayers are already contributing to FSAs and doing their best to spend all the money in 
them by the plan deadlines.  All Chodorow’s proposal does is shift some of the funds 
from medical payments to charitable donations.  Either way, the Treasury is already out 
the tax savings (for both income and payroll tax purposes) that result from the existence 
of FSAs.
223
  In contrast, the donated service proposal could produce revenue losses for 
the Treasury.
224
 
2.  Exclusion for Donated Lottery Winnings  
 
Lottery winners who wish to donate some of their winnings to charity must 
include the winnings in income and then take a deduction for the donation—subject to the 
wash preventers discussed above.
225
  To avoid this result, the lottery winner would need 
                                                 
222
 In the case of the FSA, Chodorow envisions (for administrative reasons) allowing each employee to 
designate one charity to receive the leftover FSA balance.  Chodorow, supra note 213, at 1074.  In the case 
of donated services, the saved funds would be deployed within the charitable employer as the employee 
designated.   
223
 Of course, FSAs could become more attractive if employees knew that unused amounts would go to 
charity instead of being forfeited.  In that case, the estimated revenue cost to the Treasury might increase.  
See Chodorow, supra note 213, at 1082.   
224
 The issue of lost revenue is discussed at infra Part V.C.   
225
 See supra Part III.E.   
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to legally assign the ticket (or part of the ticket) to the charity at purchase (or at least 
before winning)—something that would be very difficult to do given the costs and the 
slim odds of winning.
226
     
C. Eugene Steuerle has recommended changing the law to allow lottery winners 
to donate some or all of their winnings to charity within a certain period of winning 
without tax.
227
  Effectively, this would turn-off assignment of income with respect to 
lottery winnings given to charity.  In fact, Steuerle’s proposal goes further than the 
donated services relaxation proposals suggested in this Article in that Steuerle would 
allow the lottery winners to actually receive cash (the lottery winnings) and then have a 
period of time to donate.  By contrast, no actual cash would flow through the hands of the 
donating charitable employee.   
The lottery proposal provides further evidence that relaxing the rules for donated 
services would not be radical and may help encourage giving.  But, the analogy between 
the lottery proposal and donated services is not perfect.  In particular, lottery winnings are 
not subject to payroll taxes, while constructively-received wages are.  Thus, while the 
donated services proposal would result in a loss of revenue via payroll taxes, Steuerle’s 
lottery proposal would not.   
      
 
 
                                                 
226
 C. Eugene Steuerle, The Tax Treatment of Charities & Major Budget Reform, Testimony Before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Finance, Oct. 18, 2011, at 9.  Other countries take a different approach.  In Canada, 
for example, a couple that won the Canadian lottery was able to donate 98% of their $11.2 million prize to 
charity without tax consequence because Canada does not tax lottery winnings.  Canadian Couple Who 
Gave $11.2 million Lottery Winnings to Charity Would Have a U.S. Tax Problem, 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2010/11/good-thing.html  (Nov. 6, 2010).    
227
 Steuerle, supra note 226, at 9.   
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V. RELAXATION POSSIBILITIES AND THEIR BENEFITS AND COSTS  
This Part V discusses the various ways that the rules governing donated services 
can be relaxed to allow donations of time without tax consequence.  While this might be 
accomplished via IRS rulings or Treasury Regulations, given the current guidance it 
would most effectively be accomplished via an amendment to the Internal Revenue 
Code.
228
   
Less important than the actual form or extent of relaxation is that there be some 
relaxation provided in a way that provides certainty to colleges, universities, and their 
faculty and staff.   In today’s environment, college and universities are under too much 
scrutiny to be engaging in aggressive tax strategies or wink and nod arrangements.  Many 
schools are likely still in the process of professionalizing their tax reporting, are 
understandably taking conservative approaches to tax matters, and would need clear, 
certain rules before allowing donated services without assignment of income.      
As noted above, anecdotal evidence suggests that few universities have active, 
advertised volunteer programs—likely due to the possible adverse tax consequences.229  
Therefore, it is unclear what impact a relaxed rule might have.  Because of the 
uncertainties, perhaps a relaxed rule might be implemented for a test period—say two to 
four years—with Treasury conducting a study to quantify the costs incurred (lost 
revenue) and benefits realized (increased donations).
230
   
                                                 
228
 See discussion at supra Part III.B, noting that most of the guidance in this area comes from rulings, 
regulations, and court decisions.   
229
 See supra note 117.   
230
 The problem with a temporary approach is that arguably too much of our tax law is already temporary—
resulting in many provisions being in need of periodic extensions.  In this case, however, with a few years 
of study presumably we should be able to judge whether the provision should be scrapped or made 
permanent.  Admittedly, the track record for temporary provisions is not good.  They often end up being 
extended without much study.  For example, in 2006 Congress relaxed the tax treatment of income § 
501(c)(3) organizations earn from their for-profit subsidiaries.  The relaxed rules were put in place in 2006 
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This Part proceeds as follows. Part A reviews the possibilities for relaxation from 
strong to weak.  Part B summarizes the possible benefits from relaxation and Part C 
addresses possible objections.   
 
A. Relaxation Possibilities  
1.  Deep Relaxation:  Turn Off the Assignment of Income Doctrine   
 
One relaxation possibility is to simply turn off the assignment of income doctrine 
when employees of charities give up some of their compensation to their charitable 
employers and designate how the savings will be used.  This would be similar to the 
current rules allowing charitable contributions from IRAs and the proposal to allow 
donations of unused health flexible savings accounts.
231
  This could be accomplished via 
a new Code provision that states that gross income does not include the value of services 
donated to a charity by an employee of that charity under an agreement between the 
employee and charity.
232
  The employee and the charity would have to finalize the 
agreement prior to the rendering of services, the employee would be allowed to designate 
how the saved funds are redeployed within the charitable organization, and it would be 
made clear that the employee would not be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction.    
To ensure horizontal equity between private nonprofits and public institutions (like state 
colleges and universities) the savings may be allowed to go not just to the employing 
                                                                                                                                                 
on a temporary basis pending study by the Treasury.  But the relaxed rules have been periodically extended 
(as of this writing through December 31, 2013) and it appears that no study of the provision has been 
released.  See I.R.C. § 512 (b)(13)(E).   
231
 See supra Parts IV.D.4 & IV.E.1.   
232
 This new provision likely belongs in the exclusion section of the Internal Revenue Code.  Section 139F, 
for example, is currently available.   
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institution itself, but also to its affiliated and supporting organizations—such as a 
university’s supporting foundation, alumni association, or athletic booster association.233 
Allowing affiliated organizations to participate would also avoid discrimination against 
charities based solely on their legal structure.  Even outside of the higher education 
context, charitable structures can vary.  Some charities operate through one legal entity, 
while others have multiple affiliated organizations—like supporting foundations—to 
carry out their missions.
234
 The relaxation rule, therefore, should be broad enough to 
extend not just to the employing charity, but to its related charities as well.  In all cases, 
the saved funds ultimately flow to the charitable class of the employing charity or one of 
its nonprofit affiliates.     
If there is concern that the new provision would primarily benefit highly 
compensated employees, like the university president and other executives, then a 
nondiscrimination component (like those included in qualified cafeteria and pension 
plans) could be included.
235
   
The advantages of deep relaxation are that it is simple, easy to understand, and 
would be most effective at encouraging charitable employees to donate time.  It would, in 
most cases, completely remove the specter of imputed income, and eliminate worries 
about the wash preventers.  Deep relaxation would take care of the problem for all 
                                                 
233
 See supra note 17 and accompanying text for discussion of these supporting organizations.  For those 
concerned about the commercialization of college sports programs, the new Code provision might exclude 
supporting organizations—like athletic booster associations—that primarily benefit athletic departments.   
234
 For example, the Idaho Youth Ranch, a charity that runs thrift stores and programs for high-risk youth in 
Idaho, has a separate organization to manage its endowment funds.  See Idaho Youth Ranch Foundation, at 
http://www.youthranch.org/IYRFoundation.aspx.   
235
 A nondiscrimination rule may not be entirely effective, however, for employees of independent means.  
Employees who are wealthy yet earn modest salaries (putting them beyond the reach of nondiscrimination 
rules) may be tempted to give their entire salary back—effectively giving them a tax advantage in their 
giving programs. But such individuals are likely to be few.  Such individuals may already be working for 
zero salary under a no income/no deduction regime if they have given up control over where the saved 
funds will be spent.     
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employees—including those donating their entire salary or those contributing  a portion 
of their salary (like their compensation for teaching a summer course).   
But deep, near-complete relaxation carries disadvantages.  First, it would be too 
broad.  It would allow charitable employees to effectively enter into salary reduction 
agreements with their employers.  Employees would fund all their donations to their 
employers with pre-tax dollars, something that is not allowed to employees of for-profit 
enterprises.  While employees of nonprofits likely give to a variety of causes, they are 
under particular pressure to give to the employer.  This pressure is particularly acute in 
higher education.
236
  After all, the administration and the professionals in the 
development office want to be able to advertise to outside stakeholders (and potential 
contributors) that a high percentage of university faculty and staff contribute to the 
institution.  With complete relaxation, it is possible that employees of charities would no 
longer give cash donations; they would give time.  In the for-profit world, employees are 
likewise under pressure to give to the employer’s charity of choice (for example, the 
United Way), but they would not have the pre-tax option that their counterparts in the 
nonprofit world would enjoy with deep relaxation of the assignment of income doctrine.     
Thus, while deep relaxation would be easiest, some sort of limiting principle is 
needed.  To that issue we now turn.     
2. Gentle Relaxation:  Partial Turn Off of the Assignment of Income Doctrine  
 
Instead of turning off the assignment of income doctrine for all services 
contributed by employees of charities, Congress could restrict the relaxation to discrete 
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 See Gene C. Fant, Jr., Give a Little Bit … More, On Hiring Blog Post, chroinicle.com, Oct. 8, 2012.   
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amounts of income.  For example, many faculty members are paid a base salary based on 
a nine-month (academic year) contract.  Faculty members often have the opportunity to 
earn additional income from the college or university by teaching a class on an overload 
basis (in excess of their assigned teaching load), teaching during the summer or 
intersession, teaching in executive education programs run by the school, participating in 
certain faculty development programs, being assigned extra income via an endowed 
professorship, receiving a cash award for teaching, research, or service, or receiving 
summer research support.
 237
 A limited relaxation proposal might only allow such 
supplemental, non-base salary income to be contributed without assignment of income.  
Further, the relaxation might be limited to a fixed dollar amount—say $10,000 of this 
extra income, indexed to inflation. 
238
 This limit could also be applied to adjunct salaries 
for professionals who teach a course and want to donate the usual compensation back to 
the university and designate how the funds will be spent.   
This gentle relaxation proposal might not translate easily outside of the higher 
education context.  But it could encompass, for example, bonuses or other supplemental 
compensation that employees of charities may be entitled to from time to time.  This 
would extend the relaxation beyond the landscape of higher education. 
                                                 
237
 According to a 2004 survey, over half of faculty members get such supplemental pay from their 
employing institution. Finkelstein, supra note 131 , at 326.  But many faculty members need these funds to 
make ends meet—and thus would not be in a position to donate their time.  Id. at 327.   
238
 Indexing to inflation is important to keep the limited tax benefit from slowly being wasted away by the 
ravages of inflation.  Some limits put into the tax code without the protection of inflation adjustments 
become less and less important over time.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 65-68 (1982) (noting that non-indexed amounts in statutes may reflect a provision designed to 
satisfy a vocal interest group to gain their support for broader legislation while ensuring that the impact of 
the non-indexed provision lessens with the passage of time);   Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, The 
Cultural Symbolism of the Deductible Skybox, TAX NOTES, Mar. 22, 2010, at 1524, 1528 n. 35 (noting how, 
in 1964, Congress enacted an exclusion from income for employer paid premiums on up to $50,000 of 
group term life insurance for employees without indexing—and how the value of that exclusion is 
becoming less and less important over time).  The proposal described here is structured as an improvement 
to the tax system rather than a one-time reaction to a problem.  As such, indexing of any cap that is chosen 
would be appropriate.   
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This more limited relaxation approach would have the advantage of encouraging 
volunteerism by employees of charities without creating an unlimited loophole.  This 
eliminates the problem of satisfying normal employee campaign donations out of the 
regular paycheck.   The proposal would also offer clear rules (limited as they are) that 
colleges and universities could openly use to encourage volunteerism by their employees 
and potential employees (like adjuncts drawn from the community).   
3. Weak Relaxation:  Waiving the AGI Limits   
 
An even weaker relaxation option would be, rather than turning off the 
assignment of income doctrine, eliminating one of the wash preventers—the 50% of AGI 
limit—for donated services.  This would allow faculty to donate an entire year’s salary 
(say their final year’s salary) with less of a tax consequence.239  They would still have 
income and pay payroll taxes, but could more easily deduct the contributions.  This 
would allow the funding of more scholarships or endowments for other projects.  Such a 
provision is not unprecedented.  A similar rule was put in place, on a temporary basis, to 
encourage charitable contributions in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
240
     
This weaker option would still help encourage deductions, but would not help 
smaller donors who do not itemize.  Therefore, a combination of a capped limit with no 
assignment of income and a waiver of the 50% limit for those over the limit—or those 
paid out of base salary—might be ideal.  
                                                 
239
 I am ignoring the implication of wage and hour laws and am assuming most employee volunteers would 
be considered non-classified employees under state law—like faculty members, executives, and managers.  
This might taint the proposal as benefiting high income elites, but I think the proposal could be extended to 
classified staff so long as the donations do not violate the wage and hour laws of the jurisdiction. Further 
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.    
240
 I.R.C. §1400S(a) (suspending the 50% of AGI limit on qualified charitable contributions made between 
August 28 and December 31, 2005).   
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Regardless of the specific relaxation option enacted, the key is to clarify the rules 
to allow donors to contribute services and allow universities and other charities to allow 
it, certain of the tax consequences that will occur.  This would allow these arrangements 
to take place in the open, with solid agreements in place.  In any case, the rules should 
not be structured to cast doubt on current transactions that are already squarely within the 
no income/no deduction rule.   
  
B. Benefits of Relaxation   
Regardless of the form chosen—deep, gentle, or weak—relaxation would result in 
more donations going to colleges and universities when they are most needed.  If the 
proposal is not enacted, the specter of taxation will cause even the most generous faculty 
to forgo donations of the magnitude that can result from donated services.  While 
relaxation will cost the government revenue,
241
 it will cause giving to increase.  
Relaxation would have the salutary effect of ending the subterfuge; the wink and nod 
arrangements where the professor agrees to teach and not have any formal say over where 
the money goes yet the decision maker (Dean, President, Provost or whoever controls the 
purse strings at issue) just happens to fund the professor’s preferred project.  Relaxing the 
rules would get these arrangements out in the open, let everyone be honest, transparent, 
and avoid misunderstandings.   Colleges and universities would be free to set up donation 
policies that fit within the relaxed tax rules—freely promoting the ease of giving by 
faculty.  Faculty who donate time can even be treated as if they had donated cash and be 
initiated into the “club” levels of giving—entitling them to invitations to events where the 
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 See discussion at infra Part V.C.   
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big-ticket donors are feted.  Furthermore, faculty contributions of time could “count” 
towards capital campaign drives, highlighting faculty support for the institution.   
Relaxation of the tax rules governing donated services would also vest more 
control over the saved funds in the donor, rather than the institution.  This is the same 
control that cash donors enjoy.  Faculties, historically self-governing, are increasingly left 
out of decision making by the corporatization of the university.
242
  Administrators with 
access to private benefactors and control over budgets normally determine funding 
priorities.  Allowing faculty members to donate time free of tax headaches gives them a 
say, in a small way, over where funds go and what gets prioritized.  This could be 
empowering.
243
  That empowerment should increase donations—making the cost of 
forgoing taxes worth it given the additional funds flowing to the colleges and 
universities.
244
   
Studies have shown that taxpayers respond to tax incentives for charitable 
giving.
245
  Taxpayers will decrease contributions as the after-tax cost of giving increases 
and will increase contributions as the after-tax cost of giving decreases.
246
  Relaxation 
would clearly reduce the after-tax cost of giving by moving the donation from the 
                                                 
242
 See generally GINSBERG, supra note 169.   
243
 It might even help alleviate faculty grievances.  Or not:   
If one listens to academics, one might make the mistake of thinking they would like their 
complaints to be remedied; but in fact the complaints of academics are their treasures, 
and were you to remove them, you would find either that they had been instantly 
replenished or that you were now their object.  The reason academics want and need their 
complaints is that it is important to them to feel oppressed, for in the psychic economy of 
the academy, oppression is the sign of virtue….The essence of it all is…Academics like 
to eat sh[**], and in a pinch, they don’t care whose sh[**] they eat. 
STANLEY E. FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 276, 
278 (1994) reprinted in BIRNBAUM, supra note 1, at 219 (emphasis in original).   
244
 Of course, some (many) faculty members may have odd ideas about how funds should be used.  But 
odd, inefficient allocations of donated funds results from cash donors as well. Such is the nature of having 
an independent third sector.  Efforts may be wasted, but pluralism and freedom are fostered.  See FISHMAN 
& SCHWARZ, supra note 19, at 61 (internal citations omitted).     
245
 PRESENT LAW, supra note 28, at 3.   
246
 Id.   
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imputed income/deduction category into the no income/no deduction category.  With 
increased publicity, clearer rules, the tax barriers removed, and faculty control over the 
saved funds, relaxation will cause giving to increase.  Indeed, a faculty member who 
would never dream of taking $10,000 out of savings to donate to the university may be 
more than willing to do something he or she loves (teaching) for free—resulting in 
$10,000 being donated to the university.  But only if there are no adverse tax 
consequences and the faculty member has some say over which programs would benefit 
from the saved funds.  When deciding whether a new tax law will be good policy, the 
general test is to see if the benefits from taxpayer behavior caused by the law change will 
exceed the costs in revenue loss to the government.
247
  Relaxation of the tax law of 
donated services passes this policy test because, as shown here, there is a strong 
likelihood that the increase in giving caused by relaxation will exceed the revenue costs 
of relaxation.
 248
     
C. Problems with Relaxation   
One could raise objections to relaxing the rules for donated services.  The first is 
the revenue loss to the government.  Deficits are currently a paramount concern of 
politicians and the public, with talk of cutting spending and enhancing revenues by 
reducing tax breaks and “loopholes.”  In such an environment, policymakers may well 
object to supporting yet another relief provision that could reduce revenue.  In reality, 
however, the income tax revenue impact would likely be difficult to measure.  Loss of 
                                                 
247
 See, e.g., id.   
248
 For more discussion on lost revenue from relaxation, see infra V.C.  For public schools, relaxation to 
some extent involves using federal dollars (via lost tax revenue) to make-up for state reductions in higher 
education spending.  For private schools, relaxation can be viewed as substituting federal dollars (via lost 
tax revenue) for federal dollars (in terms of financial aid).  In any case, this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article.   
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income tax receipts would only occur to the extent the wash preventers currently apply. 
249
 The Tax Expenditures Budget does not attempt to capture the revenue losses that 
occur from no income/no deduction situations.  Even though the government is 
theoretically losing revenue because volunteers in the no income/no deduction category 
are forgoing income in the name of charity, such losses cannot be easily measured.  They 
are not tracked.
250
  Relaxation of the donated services rules would simply help more 
donors avoid the wash preventers and land in the currently unmeasured no income/no 
deduction category.   Furthermore, some of the relaxation would simply be legitimizing 
arrangements that were previously accomplished by subterfuge.  If so, the government 
really has not “lost” any revenue over the pre-relaxation baseline—it is just that the 
revenue “loss” will have been acknowledged and made more salient.   
If relaxation occurs, the revenue loss could be measured by having charities report 
the known value of volunteer time that falls under the relaxation rule on their Forms 990. 
This is another reason to perhaps enact the relaxation rules on a temporary basis to study 
their impact.  Reporting on Form 990 could help the government track trends in 
volunteering under the relaxation rules and better reckon the costs.  But given the cloudy 
revenue impact now, it is worth giving relaxation a chance.      
The most significant revenue loss is likely not via the income tax, but via payroll 
taxes.   Payroll taxes are the most pernicious of the wash preventers and likely the single 
biggest roadblock to donated services.  Indeed, payroll taxes will apply every time 
                                                 
249
 See supra Part III.E.   
250
 Likewise, the Tax Expenditures Budget makes no attempt to measure revenue losses from those who 
choose not to work.   
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income is imputed for donated services.
251
  Relaxing the rules thus has the potential to 
remove a great deal of payroll tax revenue at a time when the long-term viability of 
Social Security and Medicare is causing concern.   But any notion that these dedicated 
revenue sources are sacred was thrown away when Congress declared a payroll tax 
holiday—reducing the OASDI rate by 2% for 2011 and 2012.252    Although Congress 
directed the Treasury to make up for the revenue losses suffered by the OASDI Trust 
Fund from the payroll tax holiday,
253
  its tampering with the dedicated revenue stream 
that supports Social Security shows that payroll taxes are not as inviolable as once 
thought.  Indeed, the promised benefits will likely need to be funded out of general 
Treasury funds should the dedicated revenue source (payroll taxes) prove inadequate.
 254
    
Also indicative of the lack of sacredness is the fact that the government does not 
currently prepare a tax expenditures budget to track revenue losses for payroll taxes.
255
  
                                                 
251
 But the impact may be limited to the HI/Medicare portion of FICA if the donating employee is already 
over the OASDI wage cap.   
252
 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, §601 (2010).   
253
 Id. at § 601(e).   
254
 One might view the Social Security and Medicare taxes not as “taxes” but as payments for specific 
benefits (i.e., a future pension, disability insurance, and future medical insurance).  See JULIAN E. ZELIZER, 
TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE STATE, 1945-1975 14 (1998), (explaining how 
Social Security was originally set up as an insurance program specifically financed by payroll 
“contributions” rather than a welfare program financed out of general tax revenue to ensure that the system 
would have its own funding source sufficient to “withstand the anti-statist culture of the United States”).  
Today, however, there is strong case for viewing the employment taxes as just that: taxes.  See id. at 343-46 
(discussing the expansion of Social Security benefits which began in the early 1970s and which were not 
coupled with appropriate increases in the contribution rate); see also LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL 
SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA:  WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 54 (2013) (noting “[a]s the connection 
between payroll taxes and benefits becomes more and more attenuated, the programs [Social Security and 
Medicare] may come to seem more like welfare and less like insurance”); Charles Murray, Tax 
Withholding is Bad for Democracy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A15 (calling on Congress to fold 
payroll taxes into the general income tax because it “will tell everyone the truth: Their payroll taxes are 
being used to pay whatever bills the federal government brings upon itself, among which are the costs of 
Social Security and Medicare”).       
255
 See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 35 at 3 (indicating that the Joint Committee on Taxation does not 
track employment tax expenditures in its income tax expenditures report); see also Tax Policy Center, The 
Tax Policy Briefing Book, Tax Expenditures:  What is the tax expenditure budget? at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/budget.cfm (indicating that the 
“government could, but does not, formulate tax expenditure budgets for Social Security and other taxes”). 
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The second objection to relaxation is the possibility of resentment.  Faculty 
members already enjoy special tax and nontax benefits that are being scrutinized in 
today’s troubled economic environment.  Many (but a dwindling number) have or can 
attain tenure, a form of job security unheard of outside of academia and the federal 
bench.   Many universities allow employees or their dependents to take courses at a 
discounted tuition or even tuition free.  These tuition benefits are generally not taxable to 
the employee.
256
  This tax break has been criticized because it is only enjoyed by 
employees in higher education.
257
   But the relaxation proposals introduced here would 
benefit all employees of charities, not just those in higher education.  The relaxation may 
be more palatable if viewed as a charitable helper rather than a special break for 
pampered faculty.   
Beyond perk resentment, higher education has been experiencing broad criticism 
because of its high cost.  Donors and federal policymakers are starting to reconsider the 
efficacy of support for higher education in light of tuition increases, higher student debt 
loads in the face of a soft job market, the commerciality of college athletics, and 
“hoarding” of endowment earnings.258   This is yet more evidence of the “de-churching” 
of higher education and shows that now may not be an ideal time to ask for yet another 
special rule that benefits higher education and costs the public treasury.  But the 
relaxation scheme presented here could potentially lower costs if volunteering faculty 
members covered needed courses and asked that the funds saved be used in a manner that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Many employee benefits that are excluded for income tax purposes are also excluded from payroll taxes, 
yet the impacts are not tracked.     
256
 I.R.C. § 127(d) (known as a “qualified tuition reduction”).   
257
 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 44-46 (JCS-02-05, Jan. 27, 2005).   
258
 For a general overview of some of these issues, see Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and 
University Endowment Income, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 508 n. 10 (2008).       
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aids students—like for scholarships.259   Indeed, the increased frequency and visibility of 
faculty volunteerism made possible by relaxation may show efforts to reduce costs and 
may even create goodwill in the community and with policymakers.      
The third objection to relaxation is the possible collateral effects on non-tenured 
faculty, especially adjuncts.  Universities are already heavily relying on the cheap 
teaching labor that is available in fields with an oversupply of PhDs.
260
  If more faculty 
members start donating time, in theory colleges and universities might reduce positions 
for low-paid adjuncts trying to stitch together a living.  It is easy for those of us that teach 
in professional fields like accounting or law, and work with highly-paid professionals 
interested in teaching on a part-time, adjunct basis to forget that the poor pay, benefits, 
and working conditions for adjuncts in many other fields is well-documented.
261
  It would 
be difficult to build in safeguards for adjuncts in a relaxation statute.  Ideally this issue 
would be best addressed at the institutional level, with each school adopting policies—
approved by the faculty senate or a similar faculty governance body—to ensure that 
donated services will not crowd-out adjunct faculty.  But even if policies are not put in 
place, most full-time faculty would likely donate salary for courses they were going to 
teach already (like summer courses) or were forced to teach because of a critical need 
(like classes on overload).  In most cases, those courses would have been taught by the 
faculty member anyway, and thus the mere relaxation of the donated services rules is 
unlikely to crowd out the adjuncts.   
                                                 
259
 The relaxation proposal might be tailored so that donated services could avoid assignment of income 
only if the savings are redirected to programs that directly benefit students—like scholarships.  But this 
would add needless complexity to the relaxation rules.  Most donation-minded faculty would want their 
donations to fund scholarships or other programs that directly or indirectly benefit the students.   
260
 This is particularly true in certain areas of the humanities.  By contrast, my field (accountancy) has an 
undersupply of credentialed faculty applicants. See supra note 137.   
261
 See, e.g., Audrey Williams June & Jonah Newman, Adjunct Project Reveals Wide Range in Pay, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 4, 2013.   
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A fourth problem with relaxation is the possibility for precedent and peer 
pressure.  If Professor X teaches Course A for free, then when he retires his replacement, 
Professor Y, may well be under pressure to do the same.  If Professor Y refuses, perhaps 
because of this personal financial situation, Y might be viewed as miserly in comparison 
to his benevolent predecessor.
262
  But such fears are likely misplaced.  Presumably there 
is general understanding that individual faculty members each have different financial 
positions and views on donations.   Some are in a better position to give time than others.  
Furthermore, a relaxed donated services regime could reduce peer pressure.  Relaxed 
rules would allow professors to designate where the cost savings go—and different 
professors have different views on which programs need support.  Professor X, for 
example, may teach a course for free and designate that funds go to the X Family 
Scholarship.  No one would expect his replacement, Professor Y, to teach for free and 
donate it to the X Family Scholarship.  Relaxation, by providing tracing of funds, would 
thus make clear that giving goals are not portable from one faculty donor to another.   
A fifth problem with relaxation are the possible collateral effects on funding.  One 
issue is measurement of resources.  As budgets contract, faculty lines may be eliminated.  
If professors pick up the slack by donating teaching time and the essential classes are still 
being taught, then the pain of the lost line would not be as salient.
263
  Administration may 
get the misperception that the faculty position does not need to be restored, because it 
                                                 
262
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a somewhat analogous situation can occur in K-12 public schools.  
Sometimes union rules prohibit teachers from teaching without compensation. A teacher who wants to run 
a summer program for which there is no funding, for example, may be prohibited by the union from 
running the program for no compensation.  These rules presumably prevent peer pressure and avoid setting 
precedents that the administration may attempt to exploit.   
263
 Research and service associated with the lost position are not salient to begin with—at least in the short 
term.  It is really the teaching load associated with the lost faculty line that would cause the institution 
immediate pain.   
 94 
 
appears that the department is doing just fine with less resources.  But this is already 
occurring—with high-cost tenure track positions being replaced by less expensive adjunct 
labor.   In such an environment, relaxing the donated service rules would likely not add 
very much to the problem.  
Likewise, visible donations of time may induce states to reduce funding for state 
colleges and universities.   But states are already doing this even without evidence of 
increased donations.  It is unlikely that a relaxed donated services regime would tip the 
scales towards even less state support.
264
  In any case, if funding is in fact cut—by the 
administration of the institution or by the state—the problem is easily corrected.  Once 
the problem is identified or even threatened, the faculty members can simply stop 
donating their time.   
In addition, one could argue that if relaxation is too successful in encouraging 
donated time, cash donations may decrease as faculty substitute their labor for cash 
donations.  Some of this could happen, but the effect is not likely not to be great.  Indeed, 
studies have shown that volunteering and cash donations are complements rather than 
substitutes.
265
    Even if a faculty member does cut back on their cash donations,
266
 their 
service donations are likely to be more lucrative for the institution.  As noted earlier, a 
faculty member who would normally not consider taking $10,000 out of savings to 
donate to the university may be willing to do something he or she enjoys (teaching) for 
                                                 
264
 Increased donated services would also have little impact on donor support at both public and private 
institutions.  External donors are unlikely to reduce their contributions simply because the faculty are 
pitching in.  In particular, the faculty may not be donating to the same programs that external donors wish 
to support.  Increased faculty donations of time should not crowd out giving by external donors.  In fact, it 
may even encourage more external donations if donors are inspired by, and feel solidarity with, those 
faculty that are donating their time.        
265
 Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 
863 (2001).   
266
 See supra Part V.A.1 (noting that a problem with complete relaxation is that it would result in faculty 
members being able to essentially donate cash on pre-tax basis by donating time). 
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free—resulting in $10,000 being donated to the university.  Accordingly, relaxation of 
the donated services tax rules should result in new donations, not cannibalize current cash 
donations.     
 
VI. SELF-HELP MEASURES 
While Part V, above, makes a compelling case for reform, the reality is that forces 
are going in the other direction.  Looming budget deficits have drawn calls for tax reform 
and spawned many thoughtful ideas for raising revenue along the way.   In the vast 
configuration of things, Congressional action on reforming the tax treatment of donated 
services is slight.  Accordingly, this Part VI suggests ways that colleges and universities 
can remove the tax barrier to donated services:  via a gross up or by changing their 
policies regarding salary savings.   
 
A.   The Gross-Up Alternative    
Gross ups have long been used by for-profit employers to shelter employees from 
adverse or unseemly tax consequences.  Indeed, the facts of Old Colony Trust, discussed 
earlier, involve a gross up that occurred nearly a century ago.
267
  Because our income tax 
system’s definition of income is so broad,268 many items that an employer provides to an 
employee are taxable.  If an employer gives an employee a set of golf clubs as a bonus 
for increasing sales, the value of the golf-clubs is taxable to the employee and is subject 
to income tax withholding and payroll taxes.  Since the government wants its withholding 
in cash (and not in the form of, say, a nine iron), the employer will need to take the 
                                                 
267
 See supra Part III.B.1.   
268
 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (stating that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived”).   
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withholding on the value of the golf clubs out of the employee’s normal cash pay.  Doing 
so will cause the employee’s take-home pay to go down in the pay period in which the 
value of the golf clubs is included.  This puts the employer in the awkward position of 
saying: “Thanks for all your hard work.  Here are some nice golf clubs.  Oh, by the way, 
your paycheck will be a little light next week.  Don’t go spending all your cash on club 
dues and greens fees just yet.”  
The employer could avoid this awkward and morale-sapping predicament by 
paying the employee’s tax on the compensation related to the golf clubs.  But, as Old 
Colony Trust teaches, that tax payment would itself be taxable.
269
  Therefore, if the 
employer wants to hold the employee harmless from tax on the golf clubs, it must not 
only pay the tax on the golf clubs but also the tax on the tax on the golf clubs, and then 
the tax on the tax on the tax on the golf clubs, and so on.
270
 Because there are several 
layers of payments involved, the amount the employer must pay will be greater than 
simply the employee’s tax rate times the value of the golf clubs and the process of 
absorbing the employee’s tax is called a “gross up” rather than simply a “tax payment.”  
The basic gross-up formula is: 
1/(1 – Tax Rate) x After-Tax Amount = Pre-Tax Amount 
The after-tax amount is the value the employer wants the employee to receive free and 
clear of tax.  Here, that would be the value of the golf clubs.  The pre-tax amount is the 
total cost to the employer of providing both the golf clubs and the gross-up payments.  
                                                 
269
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). 
270
 The Court in Old Colony Trust referred to this as the “tax upon a tax” problem.  Id. at 730.  A problem 
which the Court did not resolve.  See id. at 731.   
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The tax rate is the employee’s tax rate—which can sometimes be hard to determine given 
state taxes, progressive tax rates, etc.
271
  
 Grossing-up is a relatively simple way to provide taxable benefits to employees 
while reducing the tax consequences to the employee.  Overall, more tax is paid to the 
government, but the employee is held harmless.   In fact, other than some unusual 
numbers (a higher than normal gross pay and higher than normal withholdings) flowing 
through the pay stub, the employee is unlikely to notice the taxable golf clubs or the gross 
up—since the employee’s take-home pay remains the same.   
While gross ups have long been used in industry, they are less common in 
colleges and universities.  In fact, one rarely sees any mention of gross ups in discussions 
of campus tax issues.
272
  This may be because colleges and universities were traditionally 
less sophisticated about payroll reporting and are now tightening their policies as colleges 
and universities are being put under greater IRS scrutiny.
273
  As colleges and universities 
develop tax awareness and sophistication, they should also consider adopting for-profit 
techniques for dealing with the tax law, such as gross ups. 
Deploying tax gross ups in situations where donated services result in imputed 
income would remove the tax barrier to giving and encourage employee donations of 
                                                 
271
 If the tax rate is too hard to estimate, the employer and the employee can simply agree on a rate that 
might over- or under-compensate the employee, but is close enough to avoid a hardship.   
272
 Except when it comes to compensation contracts for campus executives. Jack Stripping, Senator 
Grassley Denounces Tax-Free Perks for College Chiefs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 11, 2012 (noting that 
about half of the 50 highest paid private-college presidents in the U.S. receive some sort of tax gross up—
often related to bonuses, their children’s tuition, or other benefits).  The practice of grossing up significant 
compensation items for executives in both the nonprofit and for-profit worlds has caused some 
controversy—indicating that there is a separate set of rules for highly-paid executives.  Despite the 
controversy, gross ups are perfectly reasonable ways to address the tax issues associated with noncash 
compensation (including the imputed income that comes from donated services) for rank and file 
employees.  
273
 See supra Part III.C.   
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time.  But the cost of the gross up would reduce the benefit to the university.  The 
following two examples illustrate the use of gross ups in the donated services context. 
Gross Up Example #1:  Same as Numerical Example # 1 in Part IV.A, above, but 
with a gross up.  The basic facts are as follows.  Professor Cranky teaches for City State 
University.  He agrees to teach a summer course for no compensation and asks that the 
saved funds be used to fund a scholarship for art students.  Under a standard summer 
contract, Cranky would earn $10,000 from teaching the summer course.  Cranky has not 
reached the OASDI wage cap.  The impact of temporary payroll tax holiday is ignored.  
Cranky is the 25% federal tax bracket.  State income taxes are ignored.    Cranky elects to 
itemize his deductions and his charitable contributions for the year will be less than 50% 
of his AGI.   
Based on these facts, any imputed income is offset by a charitable deduction for 
income tax purposes.   The only tax (wash preventer), therefore, at issue is the 7.65% 
FICA rate.  In this case, the gross-up formula is:  1/1-7.65% x 10,000 = $10,828.
274
  Of 
the $10,828, the $10,000 represents the imputed income and $828 represents the gross up 
(tax on the $10,000, tax on the tax, tax on the tax, etc.).
275
  Removing the payroll tax 
                                                 
274
 One who views FICA as a purchase of social insurance rather than a “tax” might find grossing up for 
FICA objectionable.  But there is a good case to be made that FICA is in fact a tax.  See discussion at supra 
Part III.E.5 and supra note 254.   
275
 I am making the assumption that Cranky can deduct not only the $10,000 of imputed income donated to 
the university, but the $828 gross-up payment as well.  Only then would his taxable income be fully offset 
by a charitable contribution deduction.  One might argue that $828 is really a return benefit made by the 
university in connection with Cranky’s $10,000 donation.  See supra Part II for a discussion of return 
benefits.  Return benefits reduce the charitable contribution deduction.  But, in this case, Cranky must 
include the gross up in his taxable income, just like he includes the $10,000 in his taxable income.  It would 
seem that any amount included in his taxable income should also appear as a charitable contribution 
deduction.  Otherwise, he would be counting the $828 “benefit” twice—once in his taxable income as 
compensation and a second time as a reduction in the charitable contribution deduction.   This is not free 
from doubt, however.  One might still view the gross up as providing a return benefit in the form of 
increased Social Security benefits (see more on this at supra note 254). But the impact is likely to be small.  
If I am incorrect about the gross up adding to the charitable contribution deduction, then the numbers in the 
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barrier while letting Cranky decide how the saved funds will be used would encourage 
Cranky to donate his time.  The following shows the net impact on the university:  
Salary savings from Cranky’s Donated Time 10,000 
Less:  Cost of Gross Up (828) 
Less:  Additional university match for Payroll 
Taxes (7.65%) on the gross up of $828
276
 
(63) 
Net Savings to the University 9,108 
 
The university does not get the full $10,000 but comes fairly close.  And it probably 
never would have received anything from Cranky in the absence of the donation—which 
would not have occurred without the gross up.  Therefore, the gross up makes a lot of 
sense, despite the cost to the university.    
 Gross Up Example #2:  The cost of the gross up can go up significantly if the 
faculty member is subject to more wash preventers.  Assume, for example, that Cranky 
has the same facts as in Gross Up Example #1, above, except that he does not itemize 
deductions
277
 and his combined federal, state, and FICA tax rate is 37.65%.  The gross-up 
formula is 1/1-37.65% x 10,000 = $16,038.  Of this, $10,000 represents the imputed 
income from the donated services and $6,038 represents the tax gross up.  The impact on 
the university would be as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
example could be adjusted to include a gross up for the income tax on the difference between Cranky’s 
income and his deduction.      
276
 Only the additional match on the gross up is considered.  The university would have incurred the match 
on the payroll taxes on the $10,000 base pay whether donated or paid in cash.   
277
 Of course, if the value of the donated services increases much more, he will become an itemizer (from 
charitable contributions alone), which would gradually (as Cranky exceeds the standard deduction) lower 
the required gross up.  The required gross up could then go back up once Cranky hits the 50% of AGI 
ceiling. The amount the gross up would need to increase would depend on Cranky’s predictions about using 
the carryover and the university’s agreement with Cranky’s estimates.   
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Salary savings from Cranky’s Donated Time 10,000 
Less:  Cost of Gross Up (6,038) 
Less:  Additional university match for Payroll 
Taxes (7.65%) on the Gross up of $6,038
278
 
(462) 
Net Savings to the University 3,500 
In this case, a lot of value is lost in the gross up and Cranky would be working quite a bit 
for the university to save $3,500.  But that is still $3,500 more than the university would 
have had in the absence of the donated services.  The university and the employee would 
need to decide whether the donated services would make sense in this case.  Cranky’s 
decision about where the saved funds would go and the administration’s view of that use 
may well decide whether the university will agree to a donated services and gross-up 
arrangement with Cranky.   
Like nearly everything else in higher education, there would no doubt be political 
issues to navigate.  Perhaps the central administration will not want to implement a gross-
up program, because of the potential cost and because control of any saved funds would 
shift from the administrators to the donating faculty members.  If central administration 
could be convinced, however, that a gross up would lead to more overall service 
donations (freeing up cash—regardless of who gets control of that cash) they might be 
more willing.  This would be especially true if the cost of the gross up (including perhaps 
an administrative fee) could be charged back to the department, unit, or center that is 
benefiting from the donated services.   Of course, if a donated service program becomes 
too successful—providing a steady stream of income—then perhaps central 
administration may reduce the department’s overall budget—effectively capturing the 
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 Only the additional match on the gross up is considered.  The university would have incurred the match 
on the payroll taxes on the $10,000 base pay whether donated or paid in cash.   
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benefit of the donated services for its own use.  Such maneuvers, if salient, would likely 
put a damper on faculty donations of time even with gross ups.   
Regardless of the politics involved, the issue of whether and to what extend a 
gross up should be offered—unlike the tax law—is within the control of the university.  
This makes gross ups an attractive way for colleges and universities to use self-help to 
encourage donated services.   
B. Changing Salary Savings Policies   
Another self-help measure would be for colleges and universities to change their 
policies to give more comfort to service providers.  For example, they can specify that 
donated salary savings will automatically and in all cases go to the department of the 
donating faculty member, rather than to the college or university as a whole.  This would 
lessen the chance of diversion to programs the service provider does not want to 
support—like the online program for underwater basket weaving management in the 
opening example.  Of course, to avoid taxation the employee would need to relinquish 
control and rely on the policy to ensure that the funds are being directed at causes the 
donor wishes to support.  That may cool off some of the warm glow that normally comes 
with giving.  Also, the donating faculty members would not be able to specifically 
designate the use of the funds.  They might know that it will be returned to their 
departments, but are not sure how it will be used (maybe for a scholarship, travel, etc.).  
This could further cool off the warm glow or could lead to more wink and nod 
arrangements.  In any case, there could be political barriers to such policy enactments.  
Such policies should only be enacted if they advance the school’s mission (which could 
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involve attracting more time-donors in teaching) rather than merely to get around an 
inconvenient tax rule.   
VII.   CONCLUSION 
In summary, tax rules may frustrate something that should be encouraged in these 
tough budgetary times:  the donation of services by employees of colleges, universities, 
and other charities.  The tax law should be changed to remove this frustration.  
Otherwise, individual colleges and universities hoping to expand their volunteer 
programs should implement gross-up procedures or consider clarifying internal funds 
allocation policies.  Either approach would have the benefit of allowing the university (or 
other charities) to openly advertise (on its giving website or otherwise) that it is open to 
accepting donations of time and that such donations could occur unembarrassed by the 
tax system.  By changing the law or engaging in self-help, we can let faculty like Flinty 
be free of taxes and faculty like Clement rest in peace.    
